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ABSTRACT 
Corruption indexes, such as the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index and the World Bank’s Control of Corruption indicator, have played a pivotal 
role in focusing global attention on corruption. Since they came into existence, these 
indexes have been influential on research and investigations into corruption. Aid 
donors have also relied extensively on these indexes to determine the allocation of aid 
to developing countries. Despite the intense anti-corruption initiatives over the past 
decade, corruption still remains one of the greatest stumbling blocks for sustainable 
development. The lack of success of these anti-corruption initiatives has cast 
significant doubts on the contemporary mainstream perspective on corruption. In this 
thesis, I examine the underlying concepts and theoretical assumptions of the 
mainstream approach to corruption which has its roots in neoclassical economics. It 
defines corruption as bribery and views it as a rent-seeking behaviour. I argue that this 
understanding of corruption is too narrow and does not reflect the realities of 
corruption. A more appropriate framework draws on the insights of institutionalism. 
Focusing on the institutional structures and its violation in its analysis, this alternative 
defines corruption as the subversion of institutions and rules of an organisation or 
society which results in the corrosion of the institutional and social fabric. This 
alternative approach provides a broader and more realistic understanding of the 
realities of corruption. In theory, it may be possible to construct a corruption index 
based on this alternative framework. In order to give the developing countries a real 
chance at tackling corruption, it is necessary that the international community, in 
particular the World Bank and IMF, alter the way they understand corruption.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Overview 
 Corruption is widely regarded as one of the biggest challenges of the 21st 
century. The common conception of corruption is that it hampers economic growth, 
brings about political instability, disproportionately burdens the poor and undermines 
the effectiveness of foreign investments and aid. Former World Bank president, James 
Wolfensohn’s groundbreaking ‘cancer of corruption’ speech in 1996 has won plaudits 
for bringing international attention to the issue of corruption. The World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) share a similar understanding of corruption. Both 
institutions view corruption as ‘one of the structures of economic sin’ and assert that 
the social, political and economic backwardness of poor developing countries can ill-
afford the menace of corruption (Krastev 2004, p. 10). The World Bank (2009) has 
identified corruption as the ‘greatest obstacle to economic and social development’ 
because it ‘undermines development by distorting the rule of law and weakening the 
institutional foundation on which economic growth depends’. Similarly, the IMF 
(2011) states that the ‘causes of corruption are economic in nature, and so are its 
consequences – poor governance clearly is detrimental to economic activity and 
welfare’. Therefore, combating corruption is seen as a necessary step towards 
achieving development.  
  Today, people in most parts of the world are no longer willing to tolerate 
corrupt behaviour. The shift in global attention and attitudes cannot be solely 
attributed to Wolfensohn’s speech. The formation of the corruption indexes has also 
played an influential role in bringing the issue of corruption to the centre of the 
international stage. Despite the difficulties associated with measuring corruption, the 
number of corruption indicators has grown exponentially over the past decade. Some 
of these measures of corruption include the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
formulated by Transparency International (TI), the World Bank’s Control of 
Corruption Indicator (WBCC) and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of 
the Political Risks Services (PRS). These corruption indexes are widely recognised 
and used by policy-makers, businesses, international organisations, non-governmental 
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organisations and academics around the world. More importantly, these indexes 
revived the research into empirically and normatively important questions about 
corruption that scholars had previously abandoned due to the lack of data on 
corruption (Golden & Lucio 2005, p. 39).  Without these indexes, it is doubtful as to 
whether research into the causes and consequences of corruption would have been 
undertaken. These researchers have played a huge role in shaping the anti-corruption 
strategies we have today.  
 With the 2015 deadline for the United Nation’s (UN) Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) fast approaching, the issue of corruption and how to curb 
it has assumed increasing importance. Not only has there been a surge in academic 
research relating to corruption, the media has devoted a significant amount of 
attention to the corruption scandals that occur within governments, financial 
institutions and businesses. The emergence of various global governance structures 
that specialise in tackling issues of corruption is therefore unsurprising. The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Public Officials in International Business Transactions (1997), 
the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003) and the African Union 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2006) are few examples of the 
legal instruments that have been implemented in the fight against corruption. 
Furthermore, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as TI, Global Witness 
and the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA), continue 
to play an active role in raising the awareness of corruption worldwide through the 
dissemination of relevant information. These NGOs also monitor and recommend 
useful strategies to combat corruption. Despite these anti-corruption initiatives, many 
argue that corruption still remains widespread in many developing countries. This 
dismal result cast doubt on the effectiveness of the corruption indexes as a tool for 
analysing the scope and role of corruption. 
 Many who utilise the corruption indexes have employed them unquestionably. 
However, corruption has proven to be a difficult concept to measure and assess. The 
corruption indexes have drawn increasing criticism over the past decade. Scholars 
continue to debate on the ability of these indicators to produce reliable and valid 
results. Given the extensive literature dedicated to assessing the corruption indexes, it 
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is somewhat surprising that the theoretical underpinnings of the indexes have not 
received more systematic attention. Hence, the goal of this thesis is to examine the 
theoretical underpinnings of corruption, and by extension, the contemporary 
mainstream perspective on corruption, to highlight the dangers of utilising the 
corruption indexes without question. The two corruption indexes focused on in this 
thesis are TI’s CPI and the WBCC formulated by the World Bank. Both the TI and 
the World Bank have been at the forefront of the fight against corruption. The CPI 
and WBCC have been the leading measures of corruption since they came into 
existence in 1995 and 1996 respectively. These two corruption indexes have 
fundamentally altered the way in which we understand and study corruption. In 
particular, the formulation of the CPI provided a platform for the international 
comparisons of perceptions of corruption for the first time. Credit must therefore be 
given to these indexes for shattering the taboo surrounding corruption and putting the 
issue of corruption on the international development agenda. However, these virtues 
should not blind us to the deficiencies present within these corruption indexes. 
Leaving its methodological limitations aside, it is imperative that we examine the 
theoretical premise and assumptions on which the corruption indexes were built and 
how they affect the way we understand corruption.  
1.2 Defining ‘corruption’ 
Definitions of corruption are essential and important for two reasons. First, 
definitions determine the scope of our analysis and the essential concepts that we are 
trying to capture when assessing corruption. As Toke Aidt (2003, p. F623) states, ‘the 
definition of the concept determines what gets modelled and what empiricists look for 
in the data’. Second, it influences our perception on the nature of corruption, which in 
turn, affects our understanding of the strategies needed to combat corruption. 
Therefore, any research relating to corruption is necessarily dependent on the manner 
in which corruption is defined.   
 Definitions are essentially incomplete descriptions, made up of a selection of 
elements that describe the character of a particular concept. Lenin stated in his 
writings that definitions ‘can never embrace all the concatenations of a phenomenon 
in its complete development’ (1917, p. 105-106). The question that springs into mind 
then is: what is a good definition? A good definition is one that is unambiguous. 
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Hence, elements selected for a definition have to be clearly defined. It has to set the 
limits, boundaries and features that contribute to the existence of the concept in 
question. A second criterion is more controversial. Many would argue that a good 
definition ought to be objective and should not be a reflection of public opinion. 
However, scholars have argued that the definition of corruption should reflect or 
accord with public opinion as corruption is intricately linked to public disapproval 
(Kurer 2005, p. 223). The role of public opinion is thus important as it can contribute 
to a definition of corruption and, at the same time, assess the quality of competing 
definitions of corruption (Kurer 2005, p. 224).  
 The term corruption is readily used and applied by many. However, 
difficulties present themselves when trying to define it. Over the years, both academic 
scholars and researchers in international organisations have redefined and developed 
numerous definitions of corruption. These attempts to define corruption have not 
culminated in a consensus. The vast amount of competing definitions within the 
corruption literature is a reflection of the diverse perceptions of corruption. However, 
one particular definition has been adopted by most scholars in their research and 
endorsed by international organisations, including the World Bank and TI.  
The World Bank (1997) defines corruption as the abuse of public office for 
private gain. This is similar to the definition of corruption formulated by TI. 
According to TI: 
Corruption is operationally defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. 
TI further differentiates between ‘according to rule’ corruption and ‘against the rule’ 
corruption. Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive preferential 
treatment for something that the bribe receiver is required to do by law, constitute the 
former. The latter, on the other hand, is a bribe paid to obtain services the bribe 
receiver is prohibited from providing.  
These definitions dominate in the international understanding of corruption. At first 
glance, the definitions appear to be satisfactory as they are straightforward and 
objective. The employment of an objective stance is what enables these international 
organisations to compare the perceptions of corruption across different countries.  
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  However, a closer examination suggests that there are some significant 
problems with these definitions. These definitions fail to take into consideration 
private sector corruption. Corruption exists in the private sector as much as it does in 
the public sector. Leaving it out of the definition can therefore be misleading and 
present an incomplete view of corruption. Moreover, it is questionable what terms 
like ‘entrusted power’ or private gain’ refer to. Although the World Bank argues that 
its definition was constructed broadly in order to cover most forms of corruption that 
the Bank encounters, it is important to note that there are serious limitations to such 
broad and ambiguous definitions of corruption (See Brown 2006, pp. 69-75). 
However, even if we were to disregard these limitations, an even more striking 
problem appears.  
The formulated definitions refer explicitly to bribery. The reason why a 
definition that focuses explicitly on one form of corruption continues to dominate 
public policy may be because bribery has remained ‘one of the most persistent, 
pervasive and widespread examples of corruption across many societies over many 
centuries’ (Brown 2006, p. 62). However, to define corruption purely in terms of 
bribery is problematic as it neglects other forms of corruption that are not centred on 
the facilitation of financial payments or consideration. Corruption takes many forms 
and they vary according to the parties involved, the sector in which it occurs, the 
extent of their impact and the degree to which they are formalised (Andersson & 
Heywood 2009, p. 749). These definitions do not take into account corrupt practices 
such as extortion, nepotism or the misappropriation of funds. Although these practices 
fall under the rubric of corruption, they are not considered to be so by the common 
definition. A definition that focuses solely on one form of corruption is of little 
practical use if we are interested in capturing the ‘essence’ of corruption.  
Furthermore, the adoption of an objective approach has its disadvantages. By 
not incorporating the public’s view of corruption, the World Bank’s and TI’s 
definition of corruption have been criticised as being culture-specific (Kurer 2005). 
These definitions seem to reflect a Westernised perception of corruption. What the 
World Bank and TI view as corruption may not be condemned everywhere else in the 
world. The person from a non-Western society may be accused of being corrupt 
according to these definitions, but may not be condemned by his society. For instance, 
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it is perfectly normal in most Asian countries for gratuities to be given to public 
officials who simply performed their job. However, when judged by these definitions, 
gratuities are seen as a form of corruption. Adhering to these definitions of corruption 
is necessarily imposing certain western standards on non-Western societies. This 
raises significant doubts about the international comparisons made based on these 
supposedly objective definitions of corruption.  
Despite these serious drawbacks, the World Bank and TI have built their 
corruption indexes on these definitions. The significance of examining these 
definitions is to highlight its limitations and shed light on World Bank’s and TI’s 
inadequate understanding of the breadth and complexities of corruption. Any 
corruption index based on such narrow terms will inevitably result in the construction 
of biased and flawed corruption measurements. More importantly, the examination of 
these definitions suggests that the dominant conception of corruption has underlying 
neoliberal premises. These definitions derive from the principal-agent (PA) model. 
The PA model used to explain corruption focuses on the behaviour of utility-
maximising individuals and their short-term incentive structures. This notion of the 
rational economic man stems from neoclassical economics. Thereafter, the anti-
corruption strategies based on this model take a neoliberal stance against state 
involvement. Neoliberals, and neoclassicists, argue that state action in the economy 
may lead to the creation of rent and this opens up opportunities for corruption. 
Therefore, the neoliberals view corruption is a rent-seeking behaviour. However, this 
framework is misleading and misconceived. This might explain why, despite the 
intense research into corruption, the neoliberal prescribed anti-corruption strategies 
have not seen as much success to date. Instead of helping developing countries fight 
corruption, it seems that these anti-corruption initiatives are construed in such a way 
that serve the interests of the developed world.  
This thesis will therefore examine the neoliberal understanding of corruption 
and identify the inefficiencies within this approach. An alternative political economy 
framework of corruption is proposed. This framework will draw on the insights of 
institutionalism which I argue provides a broader, more realistic conception of 
corruption. Instead of taking the individual as given, as neoclassical economics does, 
institutionalists focus on the broader institutional structures of society and their 
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violations. Based on this framework, corruption can be understood as the subversion 
of institutions and rules. It may be possible to built a corruption index based on this 
alternative framework but whether or not corruption indexes can ever adequately 
measure a phenomenon as complex as corruption is, in my view, quite unlikely. 
However, it is imperative that we rethink the current concept of corruption and look to 
alternatives so that future measures of corruption and anti-corruption strategies can 
adequately assess and tackle corruption.  
This thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 examines the contemporary 
mainstream perspective on corruption and discusses some of the theoretical and 
empirical literature within this perspective. Chapter 3 explores the neoliberal view of 
corruption as rent-seeking. Chapter 4 suggests a political economy alternative for 
understanding corruption. Chapter 5 reviews the extent of the failure of current-anti-
corruption strategies and explores possible strategies based on the alternative 
framework discussed in the previous chapter. Chapter 6 concludes by giving an 
overview of the arguments in the thesis, its limitations and discusses briefly the 
implications of the alternative approach on the corruption indexes.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CONTEMPORARY MAINSTREAM PERSPECTIVE ON CORRUPTION 
2.1 Introduction 
‘Luke, you’re going to find that many of the truths we cling to depend greatly 
on our own point of view’, says a wise master to his apprentice in the movie Star 
Wars (1983). Theoretical discourses shape our perceptions and understandings of a 
particular phenomenon. What exactly is the contemporary mainstream perspective on 
corruption that has been adopted in the construction of TI’s CPI and World Bank’s 
WBCC as well as by scholars in their research on corruption? I argue that the 
dominant conception of corruption has its roots planted firmly in neoclassical 
economics. 
 This chapter starts off with an overview of the CPI and the WBCC and 
discusses some of the criticisms that have been made against it. The next section of 
the chapter examines the mainstream perspective on corruption and the theoretical 
and empirical literature within this perspective.  
2.2 The Corruption Indexes 
Early efforts to construct corruption indexes were inconsistent and fragmented 
(Urray 2007). Corruption indicators were derived from either pure objective 
measurements or subjective measurements. By the mid 1990s, a new generation of 
corruption indicators appeared. Due to the criticisms surrounding the previous 
indicators, the new generation of indicators were constructed by combining several 
primary measures together and are have therefore been termed ‘composite indicators’ 
(Arnt & Oman 2006) or ‘aggregate indicators’ (Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido-Lobaton 
1999).  
 Kaufmaan and Kraay (2007) identify four main advantages of aggregate 
indicators. First, aggregate indicators capture broader country coverage than 
individual ones. Second, they provide a functional summary of a large array of 
individual indicators. Third, by averaging out these indicators, measurement errors 
have been reduced and the influences of bias individual sources eliminated. Lastly, 
aggregate indicators take into account explicit margins of error. This ensures that 
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readers do not over-interpret small differences in the data between countries that are 
usually insignificant. The two most popular indicators used among anti-corruption 
practitioners are the CPI and the WBCC.  
2.2.1 Corruption Perceptions Index 
TI released its first CPI in 1995. The CPI does not represent TI’s own 
assessment of corruption in different countries of the world. Instead, the index 
measures the general perception of corruption based on TI’s definition of corruption: 
the abuse of public office for private gain. Countries are then ranked and scored 
according to the level of corruption that is perceived to exist. Table 1 (See Appendix 
A) shows that the CPI uses a variety of sources to measure the general perception of 
corruption that exists within a given country. Sources that are more than two years old 
are considered outdated and these are dropped out of the index. Only countries whose 
data can be supported by at least three sources are included in the CPI. Most of the 
sources used by the CPI are related to business decision-making, and focus 
specifically on assessing country risk and competitiveness. However, with the 
exception of the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the International Institute for 
Management Development (IMD) which ask for the extent of bribery, most sources 
utilised by TI do not measure the specificities relating to corruption. The CPI ranges 
from 0 (totally corrupt) to 10 (absence of corruption).  
There is no doubt that the CPI was a watershed in the mid-1990s. The CPI has 
been a formidable instrument in raising the awareness about the scope of corruption 
and also in levelling the playing field by allowing different countries to be compared 
on the same scale. The international shaming that followed the publication of the 
index encouraged countries to work towards lowering corruption levels. In an 
interview in Ottawa (14th September 2000), then senior advisor to the South Korean 
Prime Minister, Choi Byung-Rok, stated that his goal was to get South Korea to be 
among the top 15 least-corrupt countries in the world within the next five years. The 
CPI has therefore been influential in putting the issue of corruption on the top of 
much governments’ agenda.  
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2.2.2 World Bank’s Control of Corruption (WBCC) 
The WBCC is the end result of the attempts of World Bank researchers to 
improve on the CPI. Adopting the fundamentals of the CPI, the WBCC was 
developed under the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project. In its earlier 
reports, the World Bank had first termed the indicator ‘graft’ which adopted the 
World Bank’s conventional definition of corruption: the exercise of public power for 
private gain. However, the indicator was later renamed ‘control of corruption’ and the 
definition of corruption was reformulated to ‘the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 
as the capture of the states by elites and private interests’ (Kaufmann, Kraay & 
Mastruzzi 2006, p. 8). The WBCC ranges from -2.5 (very corrupt) to 2.5 (least 
corrupt).  
Although the WBCC shares a number of similar sources with the CPI, the 
WBCC also includes sources that measure specific aspects of corruption. For 
example, some sources assess corrupt practices by specific actors such as judges, the 
media and households amongst others while others look at the degree to which 
political leaders and civil servants engage in these practices and its impact on the 
basic functions of government. The WBCC also utilises sources that assess corruption 
alongside other phenomena, such as political instability or nationalism. The Business 
Environment Risk Intelligence (BRI) is one such example. The BRI measures the 
internal causes of political risks and groups corruption with xenophobia, nationalism, 
nepotism and willingness to compromise under an indicator termed ‘mentality’. The 
sources utilised in the WBCC can be found in Table 2 (See Appendix B).  
2.3 Criticisms of the Corruption Perception Indexes 
With the implementation of the UN Anti-Corruption Convention in 2003, 
international efforts towards combating corruption shifted from the short-term goals 
of raising awareness to longer-term goals of implementation and enforcement of anti-
corruption initiatives (Galtung 2006, p. 108). Despite its valuable contributions, these 
indexes still contain several limitations. These limitations can be grouped under three 
headings: corruption perception problem, measurement error problem and the 
usability in policy formulation problem (See Appendix C).  
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2.3.1 The Corruption Perception Problem 
 There is a common misunderstanding that the CPI and WBCC measure the 
perceptions of the general public. However, a quick look at the sources utilised in the 
construction of both indexes reveal that the CPI and WBCC do not measure the 
perceptions of the community at large, but rather relies on the perceptions of 
businessmen and country analysts. Expert assessments may, however, be prone to 
bias. These experts, who are often non-residents, may answer the assessments with 
the answers they expect to see. Therefore, the narrow range of perceptions these 
indexes reflect calls into question the validity of the CPI and WBCC. Moreover, 
empirical studies have shown that the results produced by the corruption indexes are 
nowhere near close to actual levels corruption (Donchev & Ujhelyi 2007; Olken 
2009). This is especially problematic given how reliant the international community is 
on these corruption perceptions in guiding their aid allocation decisions and in the 
development of anti-corruption strategies.  
2.3.2 The Measurement Error Problem 
 The second problem relates to the reliability of the indexes. Although 
improvements were made to reduce the measurement errors, these errors were not 
completely eliminated. The magnitude of measurement errors still present in the CPI 
and WBCC affects the reliability of the results produced by the indexes. There are 
three major sources of measurement errors in both the indexes. These errors are due to 
the high level of variance between sources, or produced by defective weighting 
schemes or may be the result of the yearly variations of the corruption indexes. The 
high levels of measurement errors in the indexes make it difficult to derive any 
reliable conclusions.  
2.3.3 The Usability in Policy Formulation Problem 
The corruption indexes have also been criticised on the basis that the 
assessments they generate are too broad to be converted into any effective anti-
corruption strategy. If the CPI and WBCC are unable to contribute to useful 
policymaking, what then is the use of these corruption indexes now that global 
attention is already focused on corruption? 
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 The limitations of the CPI and WBCC prove how difficult it is to measure 
corruption. However, it also cast doubts on the validity and reliability of the indexes 
and their results. These failings call for the reassessment of the CPI and WBCC, and 
perhaps, even suggest that after sixteen years, the time has come for us to find new 
measurements of corruption.  
2.4 Theoretical Literature: Principal-Agent Model of Corruption 
When talking about corruption, the question that lingers in the back of our 
heads is: Why do political leaders, religious elites or businessmen engage in activities 
that fall under the rubric of corruption? The answer given by the mainstream approach 
to corruption would be that choosing corruption over honesty is the optimal choice for 
a rational utility-maximising individual, if the benefits of corruption outweigh the 
benefits gained from staying honest (Becker 1968). This understanding of corruption 
reflects the neoclassical notion of a reasonable economic man.   
 The theoretical model that forms the basis of much of the current economic 
analysis surrounding corruption is the principal-agent (PA) model. The PA model 
assumes that there is a divergence between the interests of the principal and those of 
the agent. Corruption takes place when an agent betrays the principal’s interest in 
pursuit of his or her own (Kurer 2005, p. 226). The standard PA model can and has 
been modified to include third parties. This model is known as the principal-agent-
client (PAC) model. The client adds another dimension to the model as he or she 
provides another window of opportunity for the agent to engage in corrupt practices. 
An agent who is charged with the responsibility of providing a particular service 
according to the rules laid down by the principal is now faced with other incentives 
apart from getting paid for performing his or her job well (Klitgaard 1991). According 
to the PAC model, corruption occurs when an agent colludes with the client and 
obtains a bribe in return for dismissing the rules set up by the principal (Klitgaard 
1991). In both models, the conditions for corruption present themselves when the 
agent has some amount of discretion in doing his or her job and there is a lack of 
transparency and accountability (Klitgaard 1988).  
The assumptions of the PA/C model are summed up in a well-known formula: 
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability (C=M+D-A) (Klitgaard 1988, 
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p. 75). Therefore, a situation where an agent, working in the liquor licensing division, 
is given a monopoly of decision power over resources and full discretion over the 
decisions of how, when and to whom these licences can be given to, without any 
checks in place to monitor his or her decisions, lends itself easily to corruption. Both 
the PA and the PAC models view corruption as a ‘crime of calculation’ and assume 
that the agent is self-seeking and will make his or her decision as to whether or not to 
engage in a corrupt activity on a cost-benefit analysis (Klitgaard 1998, p. 46). 
Klitgaard (1988, p. 71) also introduces a new aspect into the model by incorporating 
the moral satisfaction an individual acquires from not being corrupt into their utility 
calculations. Given that moral benefits are subjective, corrupt proclivity is distributed 
across the spectrum from 0 (completely corrupt) to 1 (completely honest). This is an 
important addition as different individuals can behave differently in a given situation, 
thus acknowledging the existence of honest officials within corrupt organisations 
(Klitgaard 1988, pp. 52-55; Ostrom, Schroeder & Wynne 1993). However, so long as 
the bribes are large and the chances of being caught and punished relatively small, the 
PA/C model shows that the chances of agents succumbing to corrupt activities are 
relatively high. 
2.4.1 An Extension of the PA Model? 
 Another interesting approach to explaining corruption is provided by Collier 
(2002).  Terming it an institutional choice framework, Collier seeks to combine the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework devised by Ostrom, 
Gardner and Walker (1994) with Onuf’s constructivist approach (1989). The IAD 
framework examines the rules of the game that influence the incentives facing an 
individual and their subsequent behaviours (Ostram, Gardner & Walker 1994).  In 
addition to acknowledging the multiple levels of decision-making, the framework 
demonstrates how different institutional structures are affected and influenced by an 
individual’s actions and decisions and vice versa (Ostrom 2007). In line with the IAD 
framework, Onuf’s constructivist approach asserts that agents do not exist 
independently of the structures around them. Both agents and structures are mutually 
constitutive and he argues that neither should be privileged over the other in an 
analysis (Onuf 1989).  
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 Following on from these works, Collier (2002, p. 4) develops a framework 
that consists of two worlds: an internal (agency) one and external (structural) one. The 
internal world consists of the agent’s decision-making process while the external 
world constitutes the institutional structures that influence and impact on the 
individual’s decision-making process. Collier demonstrates how it is a combination of 
the agent’s willingness to break the rules and the opportunities presented by the 
external world that leads to corrupt behaviour. On top of this, he also seeks to show 
how corrupt behaviours can influence the institutional structures and affect the 
internalised rules of individual agents.  
 While developing his approach to corruption, Collier seems to imply that the 
system of incentives and punishments used to deter agents from corrupt behaviour is 
of no use without commitment rules. Commitment rules ‘create roles for agents’ and 
define ‘what they have a right or duty to do’ (Collier 2002, p. 5). Formal commitment 
rules stipulate promises by agents to abide by them. Therefore, the decision-making 
processes in societies with a higher proportion of commitment rules are always 
influenced by broader societal values (Collier 2002, p. 6).  
 Another interesting point Collier highlights is that political culture influences 
how society understands corruption. Political cultures thus affect the behavioural 
patterns of both principals and agents. Taking individuals to be rational utility-
maximising agents who wish to maximise their private benefit through acquiring the 
state’s resources, agents are therefore expected to weigh the costs (loss of 
employment) and benefits (access to state funds and resources) of engaging in corrupt 
practices (Collier 2002, p. 12). Within this cost-benefit analysis, Collier (2002, p. 13) 
takes into account the different political cultures that might influence the individual’s 
decisions and behaviours so as to better explain the behavioural patterns of agents. 
This purports to address both the structural and agency factors that explain corruption.  
 On the surface, it seems that Collier’s framework of corruption is closely 
associated with New Institutionalism. However, closer readings suggest that it is 
difficult to draw the links between his approach and the works of new institutionalists. 
On the other hand, Collier’s explanation of corruption can be seen as an extension of 
the PA model, in which he considers how structural factors influence the decision-
 15 
making process of an agent when they are faced with the opportunity of engaging in 
corrupt behaviour.  
2. 5 Empirical Literature: How have Scholars Adopted This in Their Studies? 
 The literature on corruption is vast and diverse. However, a common thread 
that runs through these studies is the adoption of the PA/C model in the analysis of 
corruption. Most scholars investigating into the causes and consequences of 
corruption or into the relationships that exist between corruption and other 
phenomena have defined corruption along neoliberal lines. Given the constraints of 
this thesis, I will only be examining the literature pertaining to the relationship 
between corruption and economic development and that between corruption and aid. 
These empirical studies have been influential in contributing to the current 
understandings of the causes and effects of corruption on development. Following the 
logic of the PA/C approach, all the studies examined below define corruption as an 
agent’s misuse of public office to attain private gains by colluding with a third party 
at the expense of the principle.  
2.5.1 Corruption and Economic Development 
Is economic development a cause or consequence of corruption? Scholars 
have long suspected that the level of corruption present within a country varies 
according to the level of its economic development. Measuring economic growth in 
terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, Paldam (2002), Treisman (2002) 
and Montinola and Jackman (2002) find evidence that corruption levels decline 
dramatically with increasing economic development. However, Kaufmann and Kraay 
(2003) assert that economic development stems from low corruption levels and thus 
refute the argument that causation runs from higher income per capita to lower levels 
of corruption. Many scholars have thus set out to ascertain the influence of corruption 
on economic growth. Analysing a cross-section of 97 countries, Tanzi and Davoodi 
(2001) obtain evidence showing that corruption lowers growth. Studies by Leite and 
Weidmann (1999) and Poirson (1998) also report similar findings. Focusing 
specifically on the impact of corruption on growth in African countries, Gymiah-
Brempong (2002) found that a unit increase in corruption reduces the growth rates of 
GDP and per capita income.  
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However, the empirical literature on the effects of corruption on growth is 
mixed. The issue of whether corruption ‘sands’ or ‘greases’ the wheels of economic 
development has been widely debated. The ‘sands the wheels’ hypothesis states that 
corruption has an adverse effect on the economy. First, corruption acts as a tax on 
investment income and thus creates an inhospitable environment for investors 
(Bardhan 1997, p. 1328). Second, it reduces the quality of investment as resources are 
diverted from their intended projects into payoffs (Tanzi & Davoodi 1997).  
Corruption therefore hinders the economic development of a country. Despite this, 
some argue that its effects may not necessarily be entirely detrimental. The ‘grease 
the wheels’ hypothesis suggests that corruption may be beneficial for economic 
growth in a non-ideal world where distortions are caused by imperfect institutions 
(Leff 1964; Huntington 1968; Leys 1965). Huntington (1968, p. 69) once stated that 
‘[i]n terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, 
overcentralised dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, overcentralised, honest 
bureaucracy. Corruption can circumvent bureaucratic rules and act as a trouble-saving 
device that increases efficiency and enhances growth. Klitgaard (1988) argues that 
economic growth can coexist alongside a small but optimal level of corruption. This 
is because corruption becomes increasingly costly to eliminate as it decreases and 
therefore there comes a point where eliminating it will lead to more economic costs 
than reward. An empirical study by Colombatto (2003) shows that corruption does 
contribute to efficiency in both developed as well as totalitarian countries 
(Colombatto 2003).  
2.5.2 Corruption and Aid 
 The demand for foreign aid programs remains high as many developing 
countries struggle to stay on track to achieve the MDGs by 2015. However, the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in promoting economic growth in developing countries 
has remained a controversial issue. Critics of foreign aid programs have long asserted 
that foreign aid fosters corruption and worsens governance. However, a recent study 
by Charron (2011) indicates that since 1997, multilateral aid has been associated with 
lower levels of corruption. His data also provided evidence that official development 
assistance had a positive impact on corruption levels from 1986 to 2006. Similarly, 
Taveres (2003) found that aid decreases corruption. 
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Regardless of whether foreign aid fosters or reduces corruption, evidence 
suggests that corruption is capable of reducing the effectiveness of foreign aid 
programs as corrupt officials often pocket the money for private purposes (Ranis & 
Mahmood 1992; Boone 1996). Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that foreign aid can 
only have a positive effect on economic growth when the recipient country has 
effective institutions that can implement good policies. Their argument rests on the 
fact that a corrupt government ‘is not going to use aid wisely and outside donors are 
not going to be able to force it to change its habits’ (Burnside & Dollar 2004). Several 
studies have found support for the Burnside and Dollar result (Collier & Dehn 2001; 
Collier & Dollar 2002). Kaufmann (2006) also finds evidence that the probability of 
project success, long-term sustainability of investment and economic growth is much 
lower in aid-recipient countries with high levels of corruption than in countries that 
are less corrupt. Therefore, in order for foreign aid to spur economic growth, a 
country must first have reasonably good governance and low levels of corruption. A 
country where corruption is rife and the economy poorly managed will not be able to 
reap the benefits of aid programs. 
As such, bilateral as well as multilateral donors have agreed that the key 
solution to the aid problem is to allocate aid based on the quality of governance of 
potential recipient countries. Although many international donors argue that their 
foreign aid policies are selective and that they favour honest governments with good 
policies, past aid analyses have shown that these intentions have not translated into 
actions. Alesina and Weder (2002) reject the rhetoric of donors who argue that they 
reward more aid to countries with effective and honest governments. The authors 
found that corrupt governments were given more aid than countries that recorded 
higher levels of corruption. Svensson (2000) report similar findings. However, studies 
also found that donors do differ in their willingness to reward well-governed countries 
with more aid. Although most donor countries do not take into account the level of 
corruption in recipient countries (Neumayer 2003; Svensson 2000; Alesina & Weder 
2002), Australia and Scandinavia were reported to have rewarded countries for their 
good governance (Alesina & Weder 2002). Dollar and Levin (2004) also found that 
most aid institutions show a positive relationship between measurements of sound 
governance and their aid allocations. 
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2. 6 How useful are these Studies?  
 These empirical studies have certainly been influential, especially in the 
development of anti-corruption strategies and initiatives. However, the PA/C model is 
not without its limitations. The PA/C model has been criticised for being too narrow. 
The reasons behind this are plentiful but I will only identify two limitations I think are 
the most important. First, the PA/C model presents an ahistorical conception of 
corruption, ignoring the cultural and social aspects associated to the phenomenon 
(Christensen 2007; Bratsis 2003). The model views corruption as a phenomenon that 
is independent of place, time and cultural and social context even though what really 
constitutes corruption is heavily influenced by societal and cultural values. Cultural 
and historical factors often determine and influence the way in which different people 
understand how delegated power is to be used or whether or not it is being abused. A 
model that neglects to take these factors into account gives an incomplete view of 
corruption. Second, the PA/C model assumes that the principal is immune to 
corruption (Lambsdorff 2002). Corruption can exist at all levels of society and 
therefore it is wrong to assume that the principal is a benevolent individual who will 
not succumb to corruption. Focusing on the agent as the corrupt individual therefore 
appears to be too narrow. Given these limitations, the adoption of the PA/C model by 
scholars in their studies may not lead to results that reflect accurately the realities of 
corruption. Hence, I would be cautious in stating that researches adopting these 
models of corruption greatly enhance or deepen our understanding of corruption.  
2.7 Strategies derived from the PA/C model to Corruption 
 The anti-corruption strategies following from the PA/C framework focus on 
changing the incentives structure that affects the agent’s motivation to engage in 
corrupt practices (Klitgaard 1991). Therefore, reforms should ensure that the cost of 
accepting a bribe is much higher than the cost of staying honest and following the 
rules (Bachmann & Prufer 2005). Such reforms can include raising an agent’s salary, 
while imposing severe punishments, such as the loss of employment, so that there will 
be less temptation to engage in corrupt behaviour. Other measures include limiting the 
level of discretion of the agent, improving transparency and accountability and 
reducing the monopoly power awarded to the agent. In particular, reforms targeted at 
circumscribing discretion can include privatisation and deregulation, while 
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accountability and transparency can be improved through democratisation and legal 
reforms such as judicial strengthening. The only way to reduce an agent’s monopoly 
power is to introduce competition in the provision of the good or service in question 
(Rose-Ackermann 1975, 1996; Kaufmann 1997). Therefore, the role of the state in 
both the economy and the political arena must be reduced. This will induce public-
private competition in the economic sector as well as allow for competition among 
public agents.  
The strategies derived from the PA/C model have been endorsed by 
international organisations, including the World Bank. A large part of these strategies 
focus on the deregulation and expansion of markets. A 2007 report by the World 
Bank reflects how committed the Bank is to this understanding of corruption. In 
describing the causes and effects of corruption, the report states (World Bank 2007, p. 
2): 
Excessive regulation, for instance, increases the cost of doing business and often 
provides opportunities for corruption. By contrast, reforms that clarify the role of the 
state, reduce excessive regulatory burden, and promote competition can result in 
stronger firms, more jobs, and better public services.  
These anti-corruption reforms reflect a neoliberal stance against state intervention in 
the market. Any policy which arises from this approach is necessarily geared towards 
economic liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation (Ohnesorge 1999). According 
to neoclassical economics, state action in the economy may create rent, and this opens 
up opportunities for corruption. Neoclassicists, and neoliberals, therefore view 
corruption as rent-seeking behaviour. However, corruption remains rife in many poor 
developing countries despite the implementation of these neoliberal prescribed anti-
corruption reforms. Hence, there is a need to stand back from the minutiae of the 
corruption indexes and instead examine the wider theoretical premise underlying the 
current conception of corruption. A more effective fight against corruption requires 
that we first understand the concepts and limitations of the current approach.   
 In the following chapter, I will examine the neoliberal framework of 
corruption and identify the key problems with utilising such an approach to 
understand corruption.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE NEOLIBERAL VIEW OF CORRUPTION, RENTS AND RENT-
SEEKING 
3.1 Introduction 
The theoretical premise and assumptions that underpin the anti-corruption 
campaign have been endorsed and promoted quite vehemently by the World Bank, the 
IMF and various NGOs, including TI. As discussed in the last chapter, the current 
dominant conception of corruption is heavily influenced by neoclassical economics 
and neoliberalism which view rent-seeking as a source of corruption. The 
neoclassicists and neoliberals argue that it is state regulation and involvement in the 
creation of rent that predominantly leads to the occasion of corruption. Therefore, 
there is no surprise that the construction of the CPI and WBCC reflect this 
mainstream approach to corruption.  A particular market-centred view of economic 
development is implicit in this reasoning.  
 In this chapter, I will critically examine the neoliberal view of rent-seeking 
and corruption. There are two bases for the mainstream view: (a) the neoclassical 
economic approach to corruption and (b) a public choice theory approach to 
corruption. I identify some key problems associated with the neoclassical view and 
briefly discuss the similarities the public choice theory approach has with the 
neoclassical framework. However, the criticisms of the neoliberal view as the 
dominant conception of corruption need not imply a rejection of the activities of the 
World Bank and TI. Instead, it should be seen as a point of departure for further 
research into identifying important preconditions that should be taken into account in 
the development of an effective anti-corruption strategy without impairing economic 
development processes in which the state necessarily plays a steering role. 
3.2 Neoliberals, Rent-creation and the State 
 The mainstream literature has a neoliberal cast not only in emphasising the 
individual, but also in identifying corruption with rent-seeking in the public sector, 
more specifically the rents created as a result of state regulation and involvement. For 
economists, rent refers to the additional income that an individual receives over and 
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above what would have been earned in a competitive market.  A seemingly more 
precise definition of rent is put forward by Khan, who asserts that ‘a person gets a rent 
if he or she earns an income higher than the minimum that person would have 
accepted, the minimum being usually defined as the income in his or her next-best 
opportunity’ (Khan 2000, p. 21). However, the problem with this definition is that the 
basis from which the extra income is measured is quite unclear. In a competitive 
market, the basis is an arm’s length price, or the price which covers the cost of 
production and yields a profit margin sufficient to enable the investor to earn an 
average rate of profit on the investment concerned. Thus, the extra amounts of profits 
(rent) are not necessary and their absence in no way inhibits the individual from 
carrying out a specific activity or producing a good or service (Khan 2000, p. 22). 
Rent-seeking is the effort to acquire access or control over opportunities for earning 
rent. Earning a rent requires the capacity to control prices, which in turn requires the 
would-be price controller to control a sufficiently large share of the market in order to 
face little competition.  
 Rents can either be natural or created. Natural rent accrues from the ownership 
of natural resources. A rent earned when the technology used by a particular supplier 
gives an advantage to the firm is called a technological rent. Some economists also 
talk of a learning rent accruing to the holders of scarce skills (Khan 2000; Aoki et al 
1997). On the other hand, rents that are created are usually created by the state, or by 
private firms. A state might create rent by limiting the number of firms that are 
allowed into a particular market by issuing licences or enacting laws that give 
production rights to a few producers (Krueger 1974; Posner 1975; Buchanan 1980). In 
extreme cases, the state may create a monopoly. Often times, and perhaps typically, a 
state may create an opportunity for earning rent in a particular market as an incentive 
to attract private investors to invest in activities chosen by the state. This has been 
termed by Aoki et al (1997) as ‘contingent rent’. These rents are earned contingent on 
outcome or on performance. Therefore, a state can offer a contingent rent to a firm in 
return for full cooperation by way of the firm’s investment according to the state’s 
plan (Aoki, Kim & Okuni-Fujiwara 1997, p. 16). This was a central feature of the 
developmental state in many countries in East Asia. Here, it is the state, through its 
‘interventions’ and its habit of regulating the market, that creates rent (Aoki, Kim & 
 22 
Okuni-Fujiwara 1997). A firm can also create rent even without help from the state. 
The creation of such rents will be explored below.  
The way in which rents are used is critical (Bhagwati 1982). These rents may 
be reinvested in the activity in which they were generated, or they may be invested in 
other profitable activities, or they may be consumed in some unproductive fashion for 
unproductive means. The state may monitor the private firms profiting from state-
created rents to ensure that the rents they earn are being used as intended. Although 
certain rents may not be invested in a desired manner, their reinvestment may still 
contribute to growth and development albeit not to the extent achievable if they were 
invested as desired (Bhagwati 1982; Khan 2000). However, the public purpose of a 
state-created rent is corrupted if it is used to finance private consumption.  
 Mainstream economists argue that rent-creation is the source of corruption. 
Drawing on a definition construed by Nye (1967, p. 419), corruption is ‘the use and 
abuse of public office for private gain’. Such a definition tends to focus on corruption 
as merely bribery and graft. It regards opportunities for bribery and graft as arising 
where there are rents to be earned from the limited supply of some kind of service or 
good. A public official may thus seek to earn a rent by taking advantage of a situation 
where there are few other officials in the position to provide the services that he or 
she is providing. This is similar to the way a private firm may take advantage of the 
monopoly it holds in a market by raising the price of a good (Stilwell 2006, p. 182). 
Therefore, an official responsible for issuing a licence may demand payment from 
applicants for that licence. However, applicants may also bribe the official in order to 
procure the licence. By the same token, firms may be willing to bribe officials who 
administer laws that regulate businesses to exempt them from these laws. If such is 
the case, applicants or firms can get a slice of the market from the state as long as they 
are willing to pay a slightly higher price in exchange for being protected in the 
market. This is seen as corrupt behaviour because the rents earned are earned at the 
expense of the client or customer. This relationship between rents and corruption has 
led mainstream economists to condemn state creation of rents as the creation of 
opportunities for corruption.  
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3.3 Some Deficiencies Present in the Neoliberal View of Corruption   
 There is also an emphasis within the neoliberal view of corruption that 
corruption is confined to the public sector and that it always involves some kind of 
private gain. Such biases within the mainstream approach have skewed its analysis of 
corruption and the strategies derived from it.  
 Among neoclassical economists, there exists a ‘consensus that corruption 
refers to acts in which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner 
that contravenes the rules of the game’ (Jain 2001, p. 73). Corruption within the 
private sector tends to be set aside. Although many scholars have acknowledged the 
existence of private sector corruption in the corruption literature, these discussions 
remain limited and analysis continue to be restricted to the public sector (See Rose-
Ackerman 1978; Kaufmann 1997; Tanzi 1998; Argandona 2003). Such bias present in 
the neoliberal approach to corruption ignores the reality of corruption in the private 
arena. Even in the last decade, there have been many well-known instances of 
corruption in the private sector. The corruption scandal that led to the bankruptcy of 
Enron in 2001 is an excellent example of private sector corruption. Corruption is also 
present within sporting associations. For several decades, corruption has been 
rampant in international cricket. Referees and players have been reported to rig 
matches or deliberately underperform in exchange for large sums of money. It seems 
that wherever there is “big money” at stake, the likelihood of corruption increases. 
Given that the scale and scope of corruption in the private sector can be rather large, it 
is absurd that the mainstream approach does not study it.  
 Restricting its definition of corruption to the public sphere is not the only 
defect of the neoliberal view of corruption. Mainstream commentators also view 
corruption as always involving some kind of private gain. This idea stems from the 
orthodox assumption of the instrumental rationality of the individual: the individual 
rationally bound to act in such a way that maximises his or her individual utility. 
Although the majority of cases of corruption in the real world possibly do involve 
personal gains and rewards, such a definition of corruption is also problematic 
because it excludes situations where the individual acts corruptly for moral outcomes. 
These cases are commonly referred to as ‘noble cause corruption’ (Miller 2005; 
Miller, Roberts & Spence 2005; Hodgson & Jiang 2007). ‘Noble cause corruption’ is 
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where the individual engaged in the corrupt activity believes that noble ends justify 
the means of achieving them. One significant example of ‘noble cause corruption’ is 
the bribing of officials in a repressive regime to achieve higher motives. For instance, 
during the Second World War, Oskar Schindler bribed many Nazi officials in order to 
prevent over a thousand Jews from being sent to concentration camps. By the end of 
the war, Schindler was bankrupt as he had spent most of his fortune on those bribes 
(Keneally 1983). Therefore, corrupt actions may not always involve personal material 
gain. These actions may not have necessarily stemmed from the drive for material 
gain, but instead, from a strong moral conviction to improve society. Thus, it is 
imperative to be aware that there are other motives behind corrupt behaviour that may 
not have anything to do with material gains. All the same, ‘noble cause corruption’, 
however noble, is still corrupt and therefore should not be ignored in any analysis of 
corruption. To only focus on corrupt acts that involve private gain inevitably leads to 
an inaccurate analysis of corruption.  
3.4 Neoliberal View of Private Monopoly and its Rents 
 The most commonly used assumptions about rents are derived from the 
analysis of monopoly in contemporary neoclassical economics, where it is argued that 
monopolistic market structures only lead to inefficiencies while a competitive rent-
free market paves the way towards achieving economic growth and efficiency. Within 
the neoclassical analysis of the market, competition is undermined by the presence of 
barriers to entry and exit. In the absence of barriers to entry, no rent can be earned 
because as soon as a producer starts earning rent, other firms will enter the market and 
drive the price of the product down. Monopoly rents can only be attained if there exist 
high levels of barriers to entry which protect firms from competition and thus allow 
them to charge higher prices for their goods or services at a higher price. Competition 
eradicates any opportunity for rent; but the barriers in the way of competition may be 
tough. 
 Barriers to entry can be created in various ways. First, a firm can tie up 
supplies of raw material. This way scarcity of supply can be created by denying 
access to raw material to potential rivals. Second, a firm may develop and then patent 
a superior technology. Patenting procedures at every stage of production amplifies the 
effect. Unless a competing firm can obtain rights to all the steps of the procedure, the 
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first producer will continue to be the sole producer. This secures its monopoly power 
in the market, allowing a firm’s to capture monopoly profits from its business. There 
are also other barriers such as the creation of brand loyalty, which can be a very 
powerful tool for capturing higher market share. Just as state-created rents are to be 
avoided as they sow the seeds of corruption, in the view of neoclassical economists, 
private monopoly rents are similarly reprehensible, and the opportunities to create 
monopoly rent must be undermined by ensuring that there is competition over the 
supply of goods or services, or at least by ensuring the contestability of all markets. 
Friedman (1980) takes an interesting viewpoint regarding this issue. He argues that 
monopolies should be stopped wherever possible but that we should not be too 
preoccupied with monopolies as long as their position in the local market is always 
contested by foreign suppliers, that is, as long as imports are unrestricted. Thus, the 
idealisation of perfectly competitive market structures subtly shifts to a more 
pragmatic focus on market contestability (Baran & Sweezy 1966; Bellamy 1986).  
 Neoclassical economists find the creation of monopolies and monopoly rents 
reprehensible because they believe that they lead to economic inefficiencies (Stilwell 
2006, p. 182). A situation that allows an agent or firm to accumulate rents by 
protecting their market power may create inefficiencies in two ways. First, the raising 
of prices to create rents disconnects allocative decisions from real costs. Second, 
when accrued rents are invested, they may not be invested where social returns are 
greatest: firms may not always use rent in a way that may be most beneficial for the 
economy. For example, rents earned may be reinvested in order to preserve or protect 
the agent or firm’s monopoly power. According to the neoclassicists, reinvestments 
can only be efficient if there are no market restrictions, or if the economy is not 
affected by distortions, i.e. where the conditions required for a competitive 
equilibrium are satisfied. Therefore, the presence of rents not only results in 
opportunities for corruption, but also denotes inefficiencies within the economy. 
 As much as they are opposed to the private creation of monopoly power and 
monopoly rents, neoclassical economists do allow for exceptions and argue that at 
times there needs to be a limit on the number of firms in particular market because 
‘cutthroat’ competition can be destabilising. Excessive competition within a market is 
undesirable particularly because it affects the ability of producers to supply a good or 
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service at a constant rate. Such competition is especially destabilising when the good 
or service is an essential commodity that cannot be consistently supplied to society. 
Furthermore, such ‘cutthroat’ competition can lead to a wastage of scarce resources as 
when it forces businesses into bankruptcy and assets that are not yet worn out or 
obsolescent to be scraped. As such, it is acknowledged, within the neoclassical school 
of thought, that under certain circumstances, it is necessary to limit the number of 
suppliers in the industry to avoid destabilising the economy. (Aoki, Kim & Okuno-
Fukiwara 1997, p.3)  
 To the neoclassicists, an ideal economic world should be free from all 
government interventions. However, the abstract nature of the theory allows 
neoclassical economists to widely accept certain exceptions that seemingly contradict 
the theory they believe in. Such exceptions fall under what is widely known and 
accepted as the theory of the second best. According to neoclassical economics, all 
optimum conditions need to be fulfilled simultaneously in order to achieve a Paretian 
optimum. The theory of second best states that if one of the Paretian optimum 
conditions cannot be fulfilled there is no single second-best outcome. Thus, any state 
of affairs in which there continue to be some market restrictions is not necessarily an 
improvement on the initial situation (Lipsey & Lancaster 1956-1957, p. 11). In a non-
neoclassical world, it is difficult to distinguish between sub-optimal situations. 
Removing some but not all restrictions may not produce any improvement. Therefore, 
when perfect competition cannot exist, say, because of the existence of a natural 
monopoly, it is then questionable what the second-best alternative is. Would a 
second-best position be one where the state establishes a process of ‘competitive 
bidding’ for firms seeking to run a particular monopoly? Or would this lead to a 
worse alternative because any involvement by the state will only open up more 
opportunities for state officials to engage in bribery or graft in exchange for the 
contract? Such questions remain unanswered.  
3.5 Corruption in the Public Sector via a Public Choice Theory 
 Although Public Choice theorists see themselves as being quite different from 
mainstream economics, public choice theory is in fact methodologically very similar 
to the neoclassical school of thought. This theory should therefore not be seen as a 
new discipline but rather should be understood as a research programme (Buchanan 
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2003, p. 13). Public choice theorists utilise orthodox economics’ model of the 
economically rational individual and apply this to analyse the behaviour of 
governments and their officials. The main assumption within this model is that 
although individuals in governmental positions have some concern for the interests 
and needs of others in society, their main motive is to further their self-interests 
(Buchanan & Tullock 1962; Riker and Ordershook, 1973). While neoclassical 
economists view corruption as the abuse of the power of public office for personal 
gain, public choice theorists understand corruption fundamentally as the corruption of 
public interests through the pursuit of private (individuals’) interests.  
 Public Choice theorists argue that the political market is like any other. There 
is a supply of protective regulations and politicians sell these regulations to private 
interests in order to achieve some kind of benefit. Facing this supply is the demand of 
individuals for protection of their private interests. Public decisions made by 
parliamentarians in a duly elected parliament are thus made to benefit private 
individuals (Mueller 1989, p. 2). Regulation yields rents and to capture these, private 
individuals are willing to pay large sums of money to ensure that their chosen 
politicians get into the government. No politician acting alone, however, is likely to 
be able to supply protective regulations; on the other hand, politicians can form 
alliances, bundling legislative provisions together to create ‘pork’ barrels (Buchanan 
2003). According to public choice theorists, the only way to stop such rent-seeking 
behaviour is to cease the supply of regulation (Gwartney & Wagner 1988). Putting an 
end to such activities will no doubt also lessen the opportunities for individuals to 
engage in bribery and graft.  
Understanding corruption through a public choice framework is therefore to 
view regulations as dysfunctional to proper government. In other words, public choice 
theory demonstrates that looking to government to achieve public purposes, such as to 
create more employment in particular regions, results in general in more harm than 
good (Buchanan 2003). In this way, the public choice theory and neoclassical 
economics are very similar as they regard any sort of government intervention or 
involvement to be harmful as it increases the chances of corruption. Therefore, public 
choice theorists support the neoliberal policies that advocate the rolling back of the 
state. 
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3.6 Principal Strategy: Rolling Back the State 
The focus on state-created rent within the mainstream economic school of 
thought and the public choice theory view that regulations inhibit good governance 
has led both neoliberals and public choice theorists to believe that the best solution to 
prevent the creation of rents and thus the opportunities for bribery and graft is to 
diminish the size and role of the state in the economy. The principal neoliberal 
policies include liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation. Rolling back the 
regulatory powers of the state and letting the market dictate will mean that firms and 
agents will no longer be protected by state-created barriers and will thus have to 
compete for their share of the market. These neoliberal policies are ostensibly opening 
up the public sector and the state-regulated sector of the private economy to 
competition (Lane 2001, p. 43). However this is only half the picture: firms can 
continue to rely on other barriers to protect their market power to enable them to earn 
monopoly profits. Competition can only work when all barriers are destroyed.   
Furthermore, while neoclassicists advocate for a reduction in state 
involvement in the economy, they do admit a need for state intervention, not only in 
preventing ‘cutthroat’ competition in given sectors, but also in providing ‘public 
goods’ and internalising externalities (Stilwell 2006, p. 201). Therein lies a more 
complex paradox: the need for state action to ensure the smooth running of the system 
inevitably opens up greater possibilities for corruption.   
The following chapter examines the political economy response to the 
neoliberal view of corruption as rent creation, and explores the possibility of utilising 
the insights drawn from institutional economics to gain a broader, more realistic 
understanding of corruption.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A POLITICAL ECONOMY RESPONSE TO THE NEOLIBERAL VIEW OF 
RENT CREATION AND CORRUPTION AS BRIBERY 
4.1 Introduction 
Mainstream economists focus on the merits of the market system in 
contributing to overall economic progress while stating quite clearly that any sort of 
interference, whether through rent-seeking activities or otherwise, would only lead to 
economic inefficiencies and, most importantly, create opportunities for bribery and 
graft. Although many scholars recognise that there are serious limitations and defects 
of the market system, these have been ignored or deemed unimportant and claims of 
the virtues of the market system remain pervasive. As Sen (1999, p. 111) states, ‘any 
pointer to the defects of the market mechanism appears to be, in the present mood, 
strangely old-fashioned and contrary to contemporary culture (like playing an old 78 
rpm record with music from the 1920s)’. The bias in favour of the mainstream 
preconceptions needs to be critically scrutinised and carefully investigated. 
This chapter will develop a political economy response to the neoliberal view 
of the developmental state and rent creation and its attitude towards corruption. The 
political economy approach to corruption examined in this chapter relies heavily upon 
insights drawn from institutional economics. Within this school of thought, corruption 
is not simply taken to be bribery or graft but instead is seen as a wider undermining of 
rules and institutions. The institutional approach to corruption overcomes the 
limitations of the narrow conception presented by the neoliberal approach and paints a 
fuller picture of the realities of corruption.   
4.2 In Defence of Rent Creation: The Developmental State and Rent Creation 
 If the conditions of the real world did correspond to the assumptions of the 
neoclassical world, then it would be logical to share the view that in general the 
involvement or intervention by the state in the economy only inhibits economic 
progress and lead to economic inefficiencies. However, given that economic reality 
differs quite drastically from the assumptions on which neoclassical economics is 
based, the strong involvement of the state in economic growth is not at all illogical. 
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Quite contrary to the mainstream’s perspective on the developmental state, the state 
can be an active promoter of economic growth by devising strategies to increase 
national wealth. It may govern the market and steer it in the direction of economic 
prosperity. This can be done in a number of ways. A state can recognise and identify 
the appropriate market opportunities and investments (Reinert 1999, p. 281). Japan 
would never have become the second largest economy in the world between 1968 to 
2010 if the state had not made the decision to focus on making inexpensive cars and 
electronics (Reinert 1999, p. 281). In order for an economy to progress up the 
development ladder, it is necessary for the state to make a judgement call on what 
economic activities are appropriate and feasible and what others are not (Reinert 
1995). After identifying the right investments, it is then not uncommon for the state to 
create a competitive advantage for the national firms that undertake the investments 
(Reinert 1999, p. 281). The success of the developmental state is best portrayed by the 
economic success of the East Asian nations and China between the 1960s and 1990s. 
Instead of abiding by the neoliberal policies of free trade, liberalisation and 
privatisation, these countries achieved substantial growth and development by 
adopting unorthodox policies which included export subsidies, high levels of tariff 
and nontariff barriers, patent and copyright infringements as well as restrictions on 
inward capital flows (Rodrik 2001, p. 58). The East Asian experience is testimony 
that the developmental state can help steer a country towards economic development 
and prosperity.   
State involvement in the economy is also necessary to avoid bottlenecks that 
may arise out of coordination problems and to initiate projects with returns in a longer 
term than private investors can contemplate (Todaro & Smith 2009). In order to avoid 
bottlenecks, there needs to be some kind of coordination of the expansion of capacity 
in associated industries. According to mainstream economists, market forces can 
generally accomplish this coordination. They argue that so long as market prices are 
flexible and there are no distortions or market failures, the changes in one price 
relative to the others will signal changes in demand for and supply of all goods. 
Agents will respond to this signalling by a free market to ensure coordination. 
However, there is an extensive literature on the problems associated with coordination 
by market forces (See Spence 1978; Bell & Romer 1987; Hausmann, Klinger & 
Wagner 2008). First, problems arise when prices are sticky, when there is imperfect 
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information in the markets, or when decisions of firms are irrational or non-rational. 
This means that market signals will be wrong. Second, there are certain inputs and 
outputs that are not priced because there is no market for them. Examples include 
clean air and, conversely, wastes emitted into the air. Unpriced goods and ‘bads’ are 
externalities of production. The coordinating capacity of market forces is clearly 
undermined as a market does not exist. Lastly, there are limits to the capacity of the 
market mechanism to make necessarily concerted and collaborative decisions 
(Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny 1989; Nurske 1953). Take for example two industries, X 
and Y. X might potentially be supplying a particular good to Y, but due to a low scale 
of production, industry X is not profitable. However, if another industry Z is added to 
the picture, as a second customer of X, all three industries may be able to work at a 
scale allowing maximum technically efficiency and thus lowering cost. All three 
industries can profit from the coordination of their investments. However, there is no 
market signal coordination and cooperation to achieve this. Therefore, firms have to 
look beyond market signals to ensure this coordination. Associations of enterprises 
can form and discuss common plans and settle on an agreement to coordinate their 
investments without destroying their ability to negotiate over the prices of 
transactions between them. Alternatively, the state can ensure such coordination as it 
has a bird’s eye view of the economy and can cajole or coerce firms to enter 
discussions (Polidano 2001; Evans 1979). The state may then offer incentives, such as 
subsidies, to these industries in order to steer them towards desired investments. The 
inability of the market mechanism to coordinate between industries indicates the need 
for the state to be involved in the economy in order to rectify these coordination 
failures, especially if firms are hesitant to enter into associations (Wade 2003). 
Economic reality therefore requires a developmental state to direct, plan and create 
incentives for the private sector in order to promote economic development and 
growth. The involvement of the state and its rent-creating activities should thus not be 
condemned as being economically inefficient or destabilising.  
 A developmental state may have other ambitions too. Just as the state can 
create opportunities for certain firms to earn rent, rent-creation in order to privilege a 
particular ethnic or social group is a legitimate goal a developmental state may 
pursue. Malaysia’s New Economic Policy (NEP) is an example of state created rents 
aimed at improving the situation of Malays in Malaysia. The NEP was implemented 
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after the race riots of 1969 to placate the Malays who were unhappy with their 
economic and social positions in society and felt that they should be granted special 
status and privileges because of their indigenous status (Lee 2011, p. 5). The 
economic, social and cultural policies implemented under the NEP favour the 65% of 
Malaysians who are Malays, otherwise known as Bumiputra-Malaysians and 
discriminate against the 25% of Chinese-Malaysians and 10% of Indian-Malaysians 
(Lee 2011, p. 1). The programs under the NEP were state interventions considered by 
the (pro-Malay) government as necessary to correct the imbalance between Malays 
and non-Malays. The state started to play a greater role in the allocation of fiscal 
resources while also increasing its involvement in business enterprises and public 
sector ownership so as to establish affirmative actions that would benefit Malays 
(Heng 1997). The creation of opportunities for rents was ostensibly to create 
significant advances for the Malays, both in income and asset distributions. There was 
also a significant increase in the number of Malay professionals (Lee, 2011, p. 8). By 
giving Malays certain special rights, the NEP’s aim was to facilitate social mobility 
for the majority of the Malaysian people (Lee 2011). The privileging of Malays was 
in accord with the plan devised by a developmental state to create the socio-economic 
conditions needed for national unity in Malaysia. The creation of rents to pursue 
national goals and unity should not be seen as corrupt.  
 However, it would be a mistake to assume that corruption does not exist. Here, 
corruption can be seen as the misappropriation of rents by an individual or a group, 
i.e. where rents are used inappropriately or misappropriated. In the case of Malaysia, 
many members of the Malay elite abused programs under the NEP for political 
patronage and personal wealth aggrandisement. The ruling elite had the lion’s share of 
the economic cake in the guise of special Bumiputra contracts which were channelled 
to well-connected Malay patrons or parties (Heng 1997, p. 274). These policies ended 
up rewarding incompetent firms or individuals (Heng 1997, p. 283). Such misuse of 
the rents is a clear-cut case of corruption. It is therefore important to distinguish how 
the rents earned are used and by whom. Of course, not all misappropriated rents are 
inefficient and retard growth. Rents that are reinvested into productive sectors of the 
economy can contribute to development and lead to socially beneficial outcomes 
(Bhagwati 1982). In principle, however, the misappropriation of rents by the powerful 
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members of a group for which they were intended has to be seen as corruption, 
irregardless of how the funds are used.  
4.3 A Political Economy Approach to Corruption: Institutional Economics 
 The current concept of corruption has itself been corrupted by the ‘rational 
agent’ underpinnings of mainstream economics and its prejudice against state 
intervention and the creation of rents. As a result, the modern day understanding of 
corruption is narrow, unrealistic and unhelpful in the fight against corruption. An 
alternative and more appropriate approach to corruption is to use the insights of 
institutional economics. The analysis surrounding the traditional institutional 
approach focuses heavily on the formal rules found in organisations as well the 
broader institutional structures of government (Lowndes 2010). Institutionalists do 
not take individuals as given and recognise that institutions influence an individual’s 
habits, conceptions and preferences. However, this social order is not an exclusively 
‘top down’ process and individuals can create and change various institutions, just as 
the institutions mould and constrain individuals (Commons 1965). Therefore, 
institutionalists pay much more attention to institutional rules and their violations. 
Unlike the neoclassicists, corruption is not simply viewed by institutionalists as 
bribery or graft that stems from rent-seeking; but instead, a corrupt act is one that 
undermines the formal rules of an organisation or of society which in turn results in 
the corrosion of the institutional and social fabric.  
Traditional institutional economists understand corruption as the subversion 
and moral violation of organisational rules, with the effect of undermining their 
capability to function effectively (Hamilton-Hart 2001; Jain 2001). Social rules are 
the key elements of social being and are given meaning and sustained throughout 
generations because of habits (Veblen 1919; Outllette & Wood 1998; Hodgson & 
Knudsen 2004). Societal habits reflect the culturally based social norms and rules that 
exist and are peculiar within each society. These social customs are bases to the way 
an institution is organised and structured. Therefore, if these social rules and 
institutions are ignored, the social order and any plan for increasing social prosperity 
will also fall apart. In other words, the undermining of institutions and social rules, 
rather than the ‘inefficiencies’ resulting from state involvement as projected by 
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neoclassical economists, may be what threatens economic growth, stability and 
distributional justice.  
  Although corruption in this instance is taken to be the subversion of rules and 
norms of any society or an organisation, it would be naïve to assume that all 
institutions are worthy of respect. Institutions can be unjust as individuals who are in 
powerful positions can influence the creation of institutions in a manner which protect 
their own interests. One then needs to be careful to distinguish between opposition to 
and the subversion of institutions. It is not uncommon for individuals or groups of 
individuals to oppose particular institutions by means of civil disobedience. Although 
civil disobedience is a form of civil resistance and opposition to the social order, it 
should not always be considered a corrupt act. For example, environmentalists may 
choose tree-sitting as their act of civil disobedience. Julia Butterfly Hill is an 
American activist and environmentalist who lived in a California Redwood tree for 
738 days to prevent loggers from cutting it down (Oldenburg 2004, p. CO1). It would 
be absurd to view such acts of civil disobedience as being corrupt. However, there 
might, in some situations, be good reason to adopt practices that bring institutions into 
ill repute as a form of opposition and to bring about change. For instance, tax 
resistance is a form of civil resistance that undermines the government and makes it 
difficult for it to function. Henry David Thoreau had refused to pay his taxes in a bid 
to end the injustices related to slavery and the war in Mexico, both of which were 
actively facilitated by the government (Broderick 1956, p. 612). The subversion of 
these rules may be another way for us to look at the idea of ‘noble cause corruption’, 
as examined in the previous chapter. ‘Noble cause corruption’ can thus also be seen as 
the subversion of anti-democratic, and sometimes unjust, rules and institutions. This 
distinction is important and therefore it is imperative that corruption be broadened to 
include the breach and violation of both democratic and anti-democratic rules that 
have the effect of eroding the organisational capacities of the institution.  
 It must to be acknowledged that some members of the traditional 
institutionalist school do – like the mainstream economists – narrow their view of 
corruption to bribery and graft. Hodgson and Jiang (2007, p. 1053) construct quite 
neatly such an institutionalist model of corruption. This institutionalist perspective as 
depicted by Hodgson involves two individuals, A and B. A has a designated role in an 
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organisation and is obliged to abide by certain rules and regulations during his term of 
employment. These rules and regulations are in accordance with the goals and aims of 
the said organisation. B, on the other hand, is an individual who seeks to persuade A 
to breach one or more of these rules, knowing very well that breaching these rules 
would undermine the organisation. At all times, A has the freedom to choose between 
being honest or breaking the rules. A corrupt act occurs when A violates and 
undermines these rules according to B’s wishes. By breaking the set of rules that A 
was asked to abide by given his or her position within the organisation, A has also 
undermined the capacity and ability of the organisation to fulfil and achieve its own 
goals and objectives.  
 Unlike the PA model of corruption, there is no need for a principal or agent 
within Hodgson’s model. Without confining A and B to being either principal or 
agent, the model thus includes situations where A and B collaborate to violate an 
organisational rule (Hodgson & Jiang 2007, p. 1053).  
 When analysing corruption as the subversion of rules, it is necessary that we 
determine whether corruption is responsible for the widespread breach of the rules 
(Hodgson & Jiang 2007, p. 1054).  A longstanding rule or practice within the 
organisation may fall into neglect or may be undermined simply by being deemed 
irrelevant or inappropriate. However, if corruption is necessary to maintain the 
neglect of this rule, then corruption is said to exist (Hodgson & Jiang, p. 1054).  
4.4 New Institutionalism 
In the discussion of institutional economics, it is necessary to also 
acknowledge New Institutional Economics (NIE) as a separate branch of 
institutionalism. The new institutionalists too recognise that the mainstream 
understanding of corruption is narrow and unrealistic. However, despite its refreshing 
perspective on corruption, the NIE does not divert very far from the mainstream’s 
view of corruption and the anti-corruption strategies it proposes remain similar to 
those advocated by the neoliberals. This makes it an unsuitable alternative for 
understanding corruption.   
NIE builds on the basic principles of neoclassical economics. While accepting 
that an individual’s preferences, beliefs and actions can be influenced and constrained 
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by both informal and formal institutional settings, the creation of institutions are also 
seen as the direct consequence of the maximising behaviour of individuals (Menard 
1995). Institutions are established to economise transaction costs; that is, they are set 
up with the purpose of reducing and minimising the costs of transaction between 
individuals, as well as to safeguard transactions against opportunistic behaviour 
(Lambsdorff, Taube & Schramm 2005, p. 6). Corruption thus stems from the 
opportunistic behaviour of public officials as citizens are often unable to hold these 
corrupt officials accountable either because they are not empowered to do so or 
because of the high transaction costs they face in the process (Shah 2006, p. 11).  
The NIE approach adapts on the mainstream’s PA model. Here, the citizens 
are the principals and the public officials are agents. The principals act rationally 
based on the incomplete information that they have. In order to reduce this 
asymmetrical information bias, the principals face high transaction costs for the 
acquisition of information on public sector operations. Agents, on the other hand, are 
more well-informed. It is this informational asymmetry that gives the agents the upper 
hand and allows them to indulge in corrupt activities that goes unchecked (Shah 2006, 
p. 11). Such opportunistic behaviour is further encouraged by the lack of or the 
inadequacy of the countervailing institutions to enforce transparent and accountable 
governance (Shah 2006, p. 12). Agents will always seek to create an environment 
where they can exchange their corrupt favours securely and discreetly. Therefore, 
corruption levels are often higher in societies where there are inadequate institutions 
and mechanisms to enforce contracts, provide public goods and lower transaction 
costs.  
New institutionalists thus acknowledge that institutions matter in the fight 
against corruption. They argue that policy makers should ensure that anti-corruption 
initiatives ‘encourage betrayal among corrupt parties, destabilise corrupt agreements, 
disallow corrupt contracts to be legally enforced, hinder the operation of corrupt 
middlemen and find clearer ways of regulating conflicts of interest’ (Lambsdorff, 
Taube & Schramm 2005, p. 14). This has to be done with the help of the state. As 
North (1991, p. 98) states, it is only by allowing the state to act as an impartial third-
party enforcer with coercive force that ensures all contracts can be implemented 
effectively. This way transaction costs can be reduced thus lowering the opportunities 
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for corruption (North 1991, p. 98). However, new institutionalists still harbour a deep 
mistrust of the state. Despite his acknowledgement of the need for state involvement, 
North states that ‘if the state has coercive force, then those who run the state will use 
that force in their own interest at the expense of the rest of society’ (North 1990, p. 
59). This explains why new institutionalists strongly advocate for a ‘night watchmen’ 
state. According to them, corruption breeds when institutions go beyond the reach of 
the ‘night watchman’ state (Ohnesorge 1999, p. 469). In line with the neoclassicists, 
new institutionalists call for the reduction of the state in the involvement of the 
market through privatisation and deregulation; in the sectors that the government must 
have a role, this role should be limited and constrained by a tight system of rules so as 
to reduce the discretion that might otherwise be held by government officials (Shah 
2006, p. 12). 
4.5 The Problem in the Use of the CPI and WBCC 
The mainstream discussions surrounding the current anti-corruption campaign 
take on connotations of both economic and political liberalisation while assuming that 
the reduction of state involvement will inevitably lead to lower levels of corruption. 
Furthermore, anti-corruption reforms derived from the mainstream approach target 
specifically bribery and graft. To make a strategy attacking bribery and graft as a 
condition for the receipt of official development assistance shows the ignorance of 
those involved in the anti-corruption movement of the realities of corruption.  
As mentioned in previous chapters, there is no doubt that the creation of TI’s 
CPI and World Bank’s WBCC was a watershed, not only in research on corruption, 
but also in contributing indirectly to the development of strategies to combat and 
eradicate corruption. Since its creation, aid donors have relied extensively on these 
indexes to determine the amount of aid that should be allocated to developing 
countries. However, the political economy approach to corruption alerts people to the 
dangers of using the CPI and WBCC wholeheartedly and without question. It seems 
that these corruption perception indexes focus attention on Nero is fiddling while 
Rome burns. Poverty is widespread in many developing countries and aid is essential 
to help pull them out of poverty. When aid becomes conditional on the adoption of 
the neoliberal prescribed anti-corruption reforms, those countries with limited 
resources to implement these reforms may suffer from the withdrawal of aid and 
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resources that they need in order to stand a chance in the fight against corruption. 
Indeed, as poverty worsens, a blanket of corruption in a general sense may come to 
smoother all hope of creating a social order that allows a country to rise out of 
poverty.  
The ineffectiveness of the current anti-corruption strategies further proves that 
the neoliberal understanding of corruption is inadequate and cannot support effective 
reform and eradicate corruption. Given the flaws and shortcomings in the neoliberal 
approach to corruption, it is reasonable to question its continuing influence on the 
decision of the international community with regards to to the allocation of aid to 
developing countries.  
The following chapter examines the failures of the current anti-corruption 
initiatives and examines alternative possibilities to combat corruption.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
NEOLIBERAL POLICIES, ITS FAILURES AND POSSIBLE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY ALTERNATIVES TO COMBAT CORRUPTION 
5.1 Introduction  
Undoubtedly, one step to curbing corruption is to limit severely the 
misappropriation of rents and bribery. The neoliberal approach to corruption 
advocates, to this end, the introduction of competition in access to all economic 
activities and less state involvement in determining access. However, these strategies 
are limited and misleading as real world experiences suggest that the neoliberal anti-
corruption reforms are inadequate for dealing with the complexities of corruption.  
 The first half of this chapter examines the failures of the neoliberal anti-
corruption initiatives to show how misleading and misconceived the contemporary 
mainstream perspective on corruption is. To get to the roots of corruption requires 
more than curbing graft and bribery. Building on earlier discussions of institutional 
economics, the second half of this chapter will examine possible anti-corruption 
strategies derived from an institutionalist approach to corruption.  
5.2 The Failure of Neoliberal Policies: A Case of Nero Fiddling while Rome 
Burns 
  The global track record of the neoliberal prescribed anti-corruption strategies 
in eradicating corruption has been far from impressive. Despite the implementation of 
anti-corruption strategies in many countries, corruption levels remain consistently 
high (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2010, p. 2). Researchers have argued that the 
failure of these anti-corruption measures is a result of the unwillingness of principals, 
or the wider community, to enforce existing laws by reporting and holding corrupt 
individual agents accountable for their behaviour (Svensson 2005; Fjeldstad & 
Isakesen 2008; Lawson 2009; Kpundeh 2004). However, the ineffectiveness of these 
anti-corruption strategies cannot be entirely attributed to either the principals or 
society at large. Having examined the inadequacies of the neoliberal approach to 
corruption in earlier chapters, the failure of recent reforms in many developing 
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countries is further evidence that the neoliberal framework is deficient and therefore 
feasible anti-corruption strategies cannot be derived from it.  
One of Africa’s gravest problems is corruption. Corruption in African 
countries is both widespread and rampant. The inability to curb corruption denies the 
continent of the opportunity to achieve sustainable development. Therefore, in the last 
decade, the anti-corruption movement has mostly been targeted at the African 
continent (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2010, p. 6). Many African nations have 
implemented the prescribed neoliberal policies aimed at reducing the opportunities 
and incentives for corruption (Szeftel 1998; Medard 2002; Kpundeh 2004; Lawson 
2009). However, the success of this ‘one size fits all’ approach has been limited at 
best. Drawing on evidence posited by Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2010, p. 7-9), 
Uganda and Kenya are two good examples demonstrating the failure of the neoliberal 
anti-corruption strategies.   
 The governments of Uganda and Kenya have both developed and 
implemented the anti-corruption reforms advocated by the neoliberals in the hope of 
reducing the levels of corruption in their countries. A number of institutional and 
legal reforms have been introduced to curb malfeasance in both countries. For 
example, both governments have decentralised decision-making processes, 
implemented radical privatisation programmes while ensuring steps are taken towards 
intense trade liberalisation and deregulation (Persson, Rothstein &Teorell 2010, p. 7). 
Moreover, the two countries have implemented various legal instruments to 
combat corruption. For example, Kenya has ratified the 2003 UN Convention against 
Corruption and signed the African Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption and the African Union Anti-Corruption Convention. The latter requires 
officials working in government to declare their assets, to abide by a set of ethical 
codes of conduct and to allow citizens to access information relating to the 
government budget. Kenya has also implemented a number of new laws such as the 
Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and the Public Officers Ethics Act aimed 
at preventing corruption. In addition, several agencies have been set up in an effort to 
ensure compliance with the anti-corruption laws. These agencies include the Kenya 
Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC), the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional 
Affairs, the Steering Committee on Corruption and the office of Permanent Secretary 
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for Governance and Ethics. The government has also cracked down on corruption 
within the judicial system dismissing corrupt judges, magistrates and lawyers.  
Uganda has also developed similar legal and institutional frameworks to fight 
corruption. In 1995, the Inspectorate General of Government (IGG) was created. The 
IGG is the national ombudsman charged with the responsibility of eliminating 
corruption and the abuse of authority and public office. Several other anti-corruption 
agencies have also been established. For example, the Directorate of Ethics and 
Integrity (DEI), Public Accounts Committee of Parliament and the Auditor General, 
were set up to review particular sectors of the government to ensure accountability 
and transparency. An anti-corruption court has also been put in place to investigate 
issues of corruption within society. In recent years, the government has also enacted 
anti-corruption laws such as the Penal Code Act of Uganda Chapter X, the Prevention 
of Corruption Act, and the Leadership Act of Uganda. 
Both Uganda and Kenya – as well as many other developing nations - have 
adopted the anti-corruption strategies that are strongly supported by the World Bank, 
IMF and TI in their fight against corruption. The 2009 Global Integrity Report 
commends the legal-institutional frameworks in both Uganda and Kenya, suggesting 
that the anti-corruption approaches in both countries are paving the way towards a 
successful fight against corruption. However, despite many years of anti-corruption 
efforts, corruption remains rampant in both countries (Persson, Rothstein &Teorell 
2010). Scholars argue that this lack of success stems from the inability of both 
countries to translate their anti-corruption laws and reforms into practice (Brinkerhoff 
2000; Svensson 2005; Lawson 2009). While the institutional and legal reforms are 
convincing on paper, actual implementation of these reforms has fallen short (Riley 
1998; Szeftel 1998; Kpundeh 2004; Johnston 2005). Furthermore, instead of 
preventing the spread of corruption, Doig and Riley (1998) argue that the current anti-
corruption strategies have only created new avenues and opportunities for corruption. 
Although these anti-corruption policies were designed to accelerate development and 
enhance governance, it has presented its own opportunities for corruption (Warigi 
2001). Corruption takes on diverse forms, all of which are ‘dynamic and often 
intractable’ (Riley 2000). It is therefore not surprising that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
strategy has proven to be ineffective.  
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Recent studies have found that the most corrupt countries are those that are 
halfway between democracy and authoritarianism (Montinola & Jackman 2002; Sung 
2004; Back & Hadenuis 2008). Most empirical studies on democracy use indexes that 
are based on the procedural aspect of democracy (i.e. free elections). Although Hill 
(2003) and Chowdhury (2004) found that democracy lowers corruption levels, these 
studies employed few control variables in their analysis. However, a more 
comprehensive study by Treisman (2000) did not find this correlation. Instead, 
Treisman (2000) finds that only a long period of exposure to democracy lowers 
corruption. Rose-Ackerman (1999) states that a democracy may increase the 
accountability of politicians and therefore acts as a check on corruption. However, she 
argues that it also leads to an environment that provides more opportunities and 
incentives for corruption as politicians try to finance their campaigns. The empirical 
results suggest that it is the developing countries that are slowly introducing 
democratic institutions and reforms that have now become one of the major breeding 
grounds for corrupt activities.  
Furthermore, contrary to what the neoliberals posit, the level of corruption 
within a particular country has no relation to the size and the role of the state in the 
economy. In fact, countries that are ranked least corrupt by the CPI and WBCC, such 
as Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Netherlands and Norway, are those countries whose 
states have always played a large role in the economy (Hodgson & Jiang 2007; 
Nelson 2010). Although the state plays an active role in the economy in these 
countries, both the TI and World Bank rate them to be “very clean”. Moreover, 
scholars also find that the bigger the size of the government budget relative to GDP, 
the lower the levels of corruption (Elliot 1997; Adsera, Boiz & Payne 2000; Nelson 
2010). These results show that the neoliberal policies to combating corruption fly in 
the face of reality. Government involvement in the markets does not necessarily lead 
to higher levels of corruption. Quite contrary to improving governance and curbing 
corruption, these neoliberal policies seem to have only contributed to higher levels of 
corruption. Instead, it is countries with a more comprehensive state-managed 
approach in the economy that are least corrupt.  
Despite the dismal results, it is curious that World Bank and IMF continue to 
insist that developing countries implement neoliberal policies to counter corruption. It 
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seems that behind the adoption of these neoliberal policies lies an agenda to press and 
force developing nations to develop and integrate into the global economy in a 
manner that would be beneficial to the developed world. To continue imposing on the 
developing world reforms that fail to curb corruption and achieve development 
reflects poorly on both the World Bank and IMF. In other words, Nero, in the form of 
the large inter-governmental organisations, is fiddling while Rome burns.  
The lack of success with the current anti-corruption reforms shows that the 
neoliberal notion of eradicating corruption by eliminating rent is greatly 
misconceived. To want to eradicate corruption, as defined by the neoliberal 
framework is honourable. However, to eliminate state-created rents in the name of 
reducing corruption would be foolish. It is all very good to portray state-created rents 
as ‘crony capitalism’. However, rents can be quite central to processes of 
development. One example is the chaebols of South Korea. The chaebols (essentially 
large business conglomerates consisting of many family-controlled firms), have firms 
in all industries, ranging from food production, automobile, electronics to finance, and 
are commonly international in scope (Kim 1995, p. 105). The expansion of these 
chaebols have been encouraged effectively by extensive governmental support and 
finance. It is this interaction between the state and the large private networks and 
conglomerates that provided the structural basis for the rapid industrialisation and 
growth in South Korea in the 1970s; and it continues to exert an enormous amount of 
influence on the country’s economy (Kim 1995). Therefore, it is quite unlikely that 
any government will be willing to sacrifice something that is essential for turning the 
wheels of capitalism. To eliminate possible corruption by eliminating rents would be 
to put development at risk.  
 This is not to say that state-created rents are not misappropriated by cronies. 
Governments may favour business owners who are of the same race, religion and 
ethnicity as themselves. One such example is Syria. The Alawites in Syria are 
favoured and given special privileges in the government and in the business sector 
because President Assad is an Alawite (Shadid 2011). The same can be said in 
Mubarak’s Egypt, where groups of rich businessmen aligned with the Mubarak family 
were given special favours and appointed as key government ministers and governing 
party members (Fahim, Slackman & Rohde 2011). Cronyism concentrates power and 
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wealth in the hands of a few. Noam Chomsky (2008) once stated in an interview that 
‘crony is superfluous when describing capitalism’. Businesses and political power are 
interconnected. Rich businessmen provide money to the government in exchange for 
political and economic favours. However, this is not far from saying that governments 
provide otherwise-missing incentives to private companies to undertake investments 
necessary for the economy as a whole. Such actions are sometimes necessary as a 
government’s first priority is to eliminate deficiencies in the market incentives if 
possible. The problem here is who the government chooses to protect and endow 
favours upon and on what basis.  
 In order to effectively tackle the problem of corruption, it is imperative that 
the international community recognise that there are broader structures and 
complexities surrounding corruption that go beyond what the neoliberal framework 
acknowledges.  
5.3 Possible Strategies to Combat Corruption 
 Neoliberal commentaries identify corruption with graft and bribery. However, 
as established in previous chapters, this approach is too narrow. A broader, more 
realistic understanding of corruption is to view corruption as the subversion of formal 
rules of a society regardless of whether or not these formal rules are democratic or 
otherwise. This concern for the development of rules that achieve social order leads to 
quite different directions from the current neoliberal conception, both in terms of the 
understanding of the broader complexities of corruption and also in the development 
of anti-corruption strategies. Based on the institutionalist framework, corruption 
levels can only be reduced if people within a given society abide by and adhere to the 
rules. However, people will only comply with the rules if they feel that they are 
responsible for and ‘own’ these institutions. Therefore, a central feature of possible 
anti-corruption strategies is to ensure that the people of a given community are 
involved systematically and extensively in the formation and adaptation of institutions 
and rules so that they will have a sense of ownership over the rules by which their 
social interactions are governed. This way people will be more likely to resist 
corruption in favour of well-deliberated reforms. 
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In the absence of checks and balances, rule makers will tend to implement 
rules that further their interests. Thus, rules that are not well-deliberated and do not 
reflect a wider spread of interests will always end up suiting those who are in power. 
Correspondingly, powerful rule makers will attempt to suppress and deny opposing 
interests in perpetuating and maintaining a particular set of institutions. By the same 
token, those in opposition will subvert and corrupt any rules that happen to be created. 
In order to ensure that people will respect the social institutions and defend them, the 
rule-making process within a parliament or congress needs to be open to all sectors of 
society. All forms of civil society, including those who are in opposition of the rule, 
should be allowed to participate in this process. Although their views may be 
contradictory, it is important that all parties who are most interested and concern over 
a particular public good be allowed the opportunity to come together to deliberate and 
voice their opinions on the matter. Through these deliberations, it is hoped that a 
compromise can be achieved. Hence, these processes must be genuinely open so that 
the outcomes will be accepted and consented by the bulk of the people.  
None of this is to say that (i) people who are not well-served by the rules that 
exist should not or do not oppose to them or (ii) that the effective subversion of a rule 
may not be an effective means of opposition.  
The benefits of public debate and deliberation are well-known. Sen argues that 
public deliberation exposes people to differing beliefs and helps them to overcome 
their parochial biases (Sen 2009). This ensures that the decisions made are done so in 
the interests of everyone in society. As Rawls (1997, p. 770) states, ‘[c]itizens are 
reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of cooperation 
over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of social 
cooperation’. Although public debate may not always lead to a unanimous agreement, 
it gives everyone a fair chance to voice their concerns, defend their interests, listen 
and consider the beliefs and opinions of others and ultimately contribute to the 
creation of a rule that they promise to abide by in the interests of justice, equality and 
fairness. Such an approach is in line with deliberative democracy (Sen 2009).  
 At the core of a deliberative democracy is the notion that there be reasoned 
discussion in the political arena. Prachett (1999, p. 616) once stated that ‘there is 
nothing particularly new about public participation as a supplement to representative 
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democracy’. It is not uncommon to hear a government holding public hearings or 
soliciting public opinions and comments on particular matters of importance. 
Deliberative democracy, however, goes beyond consulting citizens of a society. It 
also advocates that ordinary people should participate in actual decision-making. This 
way public decisions are determined by the citizens who will be affected by them. 
‘Deliberative democrats’ believe that people who will be affected by or who are most 
interested in a particular public good should be given the opportunity to voice their 
opinions and play a role in creating and implanting the social rules necessary to 
achieve material prosperity and social justice. The most effective way of safeguarding 
society against corruption and attempts to undermine stability, growth and just 
distribution is then to get all sections of society involved in the rule-making process. 
The responsibility and ownership over these rules will ensure that the chances of 
subversion are slimmer and that rules will not be unjust or corrupted.  
 The possible anti-corruption strategies advocated in this thesis emphasise on 
the need to empower individuals in society to allow them to take ownership in the 
creation of the rules which they will live by. This proposed strategy would no doubt 
come under attack by neoliberals as being too idealistic and utopian. Experience has 
shown that public goals are often easily captured by private interests and rules are 
corrupted to promote private purposes. Therefore, the only way to curb corruption 
effectively is to actively sustain agreed public purposes. This means that the long-
term anti-corruption reforms should take the form of pro-democratic reforms. Public 
choice theorists can be expected to support the above proposition. They have a deep 
distrust of government officials, viewing them like any other individuals who would 
put their own interests over that of society. Hence, some public choice theorists might 
be inclined to push for deliberative democracy as a tractable anti-corruption strategy 
in which civil society plays a large role in determining the rules and institutions of a 
society. On the other hand, they would simultaneously and more fundamentally 
promote the scope for private choices within free markets.  
 Historical experiences have shown that the current methods of curbing 
corruption are ineffective. However, trying to curb corruption should not be seen as 
unrealistic or impractical. It is important that the international community continues 
to support and aid developing countries in their fight against corruption. By changing 
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the way we understand corruption, we can devise new anti-corruption initiatives that 
are better suited to tackling corruption.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
6.1 Introduction 
Over the past decade, scholars have tried to explain and predict both the 
causes and consequences of corruption and devise anti-corruption strategies to help 
developing countries combat corruption. High levels of corruption have inhibited 
economic growth and development in many developing nations. In order for 
developing countries to get back on track to achieve the MDGs by 2015, the fight 
against corruption has to be made a top priority. Many aid donors rely heavily on the 
corruption indexes to determine the amount of aid, if any, that should be given to 
developing nations. However, as developmental aid is made conditional on declining 
levels of corruption, the implementation of ineffective anti-corruption reforms means 
corruption remains widespread and aid is held back.  
 The lack of success of the neoliberal prescribed policies casts doubts on the 
ability of the neoliberal framework to analyse and devise strategies to combat 
corruption. However, the World Bank and IMF have continued to insist that 
developing countries implement these strategies. Rather than just fiddling as Nero did, 
the World Bank and IMF need to re-examine their current approach to corruption in 
order to develop more appropriate and comprehensive anti-corruption strategies. This 
chapter provides an overview of the arguments made in this thesis, considers its 
limitations and concludes with remarks on the implications for future measures of 
corruption and other possible frameworks for analysing corruption.  
6.2 Overview and Contributions 
 The neoliberal framework that underlies the current anti-corruption rhetoric 
defines corruption as the misuse of public office for private gain. There are three 
major deficiencies that make the approach too narrow for any adequate analysis of 
corruption. First, its focus on corruption as either bribery or graft means that other 
types of corruption are left out of the analytical framework. Second, the neoliberals 
confine their analysis of corruption to the public sector. By disregarding private sector 
corruption, the neoliberal framework presents an incomplete view of corruption. 
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However, even if we were to set aside these limitations, there are still serious 
misgivings about the neoliberal methodology used in their analysis of corruption. The 
last limitation, and perhaps its biggest limitation, is the tendency to view rent-creation 
as a source of corruption. This notion is misconceived. As seen in the case of South 
Korea, rent-seeking has and can contribute extensively to the development process. 
To eliminate rents might therefore hamper economic development. A better 
understanding of corruption in this instance would be to view it as the 
misappropriation of rents. The anti-corruption strategies advocated by the neoliberals 
focus on limiting the role of the state. Neoliberals believe that state involvement may 
create rent and thus the occasion of corruption. This understanding of corruption is 
misleading and may explain the lack of success of the anti-corruption initiatives thus 
far.  
 I argue that a more effective analysis of corruption can be drawn from 
institutional economics. Here, a corrupt act is one that undermines the rules of an 
organisation or society which in turn results in the corrosion of the institutional and 
social fabric. Hence, a central feature of possible anti-corruption strategies based on 
this understanding of corruption is to ensure that all members of society are given a 
chance to participate in the formation and adaptation of institutions. Only when 
citizens feel responsible for the rules will they abide by it and avoid bringing them 
into disrepute. A comprehensive anti-corruption strategy will thus emphasise on the 
implementation of a deliberative democracy.  
6.3 Limitations 
 The biggest limitation of this thesis concerns the proposal to establish 
deliberative democracy. The criticisms made against deliberative democracy are 
plentiful and proposing it as an alternative measure to combat corruption inevitably 
raises a lot of doubts and questions. This is, however, not the time and place to have 
an in-depth assessment on the undesirability of deliberative democracy or the ways in 
which we should limit or enhance it. However, I will point out three key 
contradictions within the deliberative theory.  
 One purpose of deliberative democracy is to ensure the legitimacy of 
outcomes. For ‘deliberative democrats’, ‘free deliberation among equals is the basis 
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of legitimacy’ (Cohen 2006, p. 162). In order to achieve any legitimate and just 
outcome, participants in the process need to be open and accept that one’s pre-formed 
preferences and beliefs may be transformed in the face of better ideas and arguments 
(Dryzek 2000 p. 2). However, can individuals always come together and deliberate 
freely and reasonably with one another as equals? And can they do so even though 
their individual preferences may be irrational and unreasonable to begin with? If the 
answers to these questions are ‘no’, then the process is necessarily biased and the 
outcomes will only perpetuate inequality and injustice. The implementation of these 
anti-democratic rules and institutions will only open up more opportunities for 
corruption as individuals whose interests are frustrated by these rules and institutions 
will undermine them.   
 The second contradiction within the deliberative theory is with regards to 
scale. In order for an outcome to be legitimate, it needs to have received ‘reflective 
assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the 
decision in question’ (Dryzek 2001, p. 651). Therefore, everyone who is interested 
and concern over the outcome has to take part in the deliberative process in order for 
the outcome to be legitimate. However, while leaving out too many people will result 
in illegitimate outcomes, bringing in too many people may also undermine the 
deliberative process and turn it into a speech-making event instead of a deliberative 
one (Goodin 2000, p. 83n). Therefore, it is necessary for individuals who want to 
participate in the deliberative forum to fulfil a set of procedural requirements 
(Parkinson 2003, p. 181). The conditions participants must meet include the ability to 
communicate competently, inclusiveness (Cohen 1989; Gutmann & Thompson 1996) 
and a willingness to set aside personal strategic concerns to achieve an outcome that 
will be just for all (Dryzek 2000, p. 2). These procedural conditions ensure that the 
process is more than ‘mere talk’ (Parkinson 2003, p. 181). However, a paradox arises. 
An individual’s willingness to take part in deliberative forums is motivated by the 
need to express and stand up for their pre-formed beliefs and preferences (Rawls 
1996, p. 82). Why would anyone then enter into a deliberative forum when to enter it 
they have to first abandon their beliefs? Having such a requirement means that many 
individuals who may be affected by or interested in a certain outcome will not be 
allowed to partake in the deliberative process. This undermines the principle of 
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openness. Such processes run the risk of producing anti-democratic and unjust 
outcomes and therefore will be counterproductive in the fight against corruption.  
 The last contradiction is closely related to the outcome of the deliberative 
process. Advocates of deliberation argue that it leads to reasoning and rationalisation, 
both of which enables individuals to overcome their bias and set aside their 
preferences in order to establish institutional rules and arrangements that will be 
beneficial for society (Sen 2009). However, how can we be sure that a deliberative 
process will lead us to the best outcome all the time? The next question that follows 
then is whether we should continue to deliberate if it is obvious that the best 
institutional rules and arrangements cannot be achieved through deliberation? If we 
do allow for exceptions that override the deliberative process, then are we not 
undermining and subverting the very process aimed at reducing corruption? Such an 
act is in itself a corrupt practice.  
 Despite these contradictions, there is no doubt that the implementation of a 
deliberative democracy can be beneficial for society. If implemented properly, 
deliberative democracy can reduce the opportunities for corruption. Therefore, there 
is no reason to set aside the idea of a deliberative system as an alternative to the 
current anti-corruption measures.  
6.4 Implications for the Measures of Corruption 
 The rejection of the mainstream perspective on corruption then begs the 
question of whether or not measures of corruption can be built based on the 
institutional approach to corruption.  
 Essentially, corruption indexes reduce the different dimensions of corruption 
into a single number. Take for example, the CPI and WBCC. Adopting the neoliberal 
view that corruption is bribery, both indexes limited its measurement of corruption to 
the quantity of bribes (Zaman & Rahim 2009, p. 118). Therefore, a corruption index 
based on an institutionalist approach would only need to measure the number of times 
a rule is being subverted and brought into disrepute. However, reducing the different 
dimensions of corruption into a single number is done at the expense of a large 
amount of information and the results can never be wholly accurate (Zaman & Rahim 
2009). Going back to the previous example, in order for the CPI and WBCC to 
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measure the quantity of bribes, both indexes need to calculate the number of bribes 
and the size or volume of the bribes. However, it is quite impossible for a corruption 
index to reconcile these two separate dimensions and arrive at an unambiguous and 
accurate ranking (Zaman & Rahim 2009, p. 119).  
Similarly, it is not as straightforward to construct a corruption index based on 
the institutional framework. We revisit the case of ‘noble cause corruption’. As 
discussed in chapter four, ‘noble cause corruption’ is the breach and violation of anti-
democratic rules and institutions. Given that corruption indexes produce a one 
number summary of corruption levels, no distinction will be made between corruption 
and ‘noble cause corruption’. However, it is extremely misleading to rank countries as 
‘very corrupt’ when the rules that are being subverted are anti-democratic and unjust. 
It would be unreasonable for citizens to have to abide by such rules. Rankings that 
take into account ‘noble cause corruption’ might be to the disadvantage of a 
developing country where most institutions and rules are anti-democratic or unjust. It 
would be especially harsh on the citizens if aid were withheld on this basis. Often 
times, countries depend on aid, not only for development, but also to implement the 
anti-corruption initiatives necessary to remove these anti-democratic rules.   
No matter how one may define corruption, the different dimensions of 
corruption make it difficult for any corruption index to meaningfully measure the 
phenomenon. This is not to say that corruption indexes are totally redundant. If 
complimented by other indicators, corruption indexes can shed light on vital aspects 
of corruption that a single measure would not be able to do (Galtung 2006, p. 124). As 
long as these indexes are not used as general measures of overall corruption, it can 
still be used purposefully in the fight against corruption.  
6.5 Concluding Remarks: The Future of The ‘Corruption’ Debate 
 Corruption is a multidimensional phenomenon. Although the term corruption 
is often readily applied, its contents are not as easy to grasp. What is deemed to be 
corrupt is dependant on the prevailing norms of a society. This explains why there 
still remains considerable dispute when it comes to defining the boundary between a 
corrupt act and a non-corrupt act. However, in order to effectively combat corruption, 
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it is imperative that both the developed and developing world agree on what 
constitutes corruption.  
 Although the alternative I have proposed in this thesis is quite different from 
the neoliberal view of corruption, both understandings of corruption present a rather 
optimistic view of corruption as a phenomenon that can be curbed and potentially 
eradicated. However, the complex nature of corruption suggests that it may be 
necessary to fundamentally rethink the concept of corruption. Instead of viewing 
corruption merely as a defect of arrangements, corruption can also be seen as a 
phenomenon that is deeply embedded in the economic system. In this instance, the 
exploitation of workers can be seen as fundamentally corrupt. Within the capitalist 
system, workers are constantly exploited by their employers for want of more profits. 
Such exploitations can lead to widespread discontent and dampen the morale of 
workers. This in turn affects the economic performance of the workers and can 
disrupt the economy. However, such exploitation is necessary to drive capitalism’s 
engine and thus will never be entirely eradicated. This approach views corruption as a 
symptom of the broader problems related to the economic system. As such, the only 
way to eradicate corruption would be to eliminate the structural inequalities present in 
the economic system.  
Fifteen years have passed since Wolfensohn’s speech. Today, corruption still 
threatens the foundation of many societies around the world. The deficiencies in the 
contemporary mainstream perspective on corruption severely limit its ability to 
adequately analyse corruption and design solutions to combat it. International aid 
donors should therefore be cautious when relying on the CPI and WBCC in 
determining aid allocations to developing countries.  
The complex nature of corruption and the difficulties in measuring it should 
not be reasons to discard further research into corruption. Just because it is an 
increasingly complex problem does not mean that it cannot be solved. As Berlinksi 
(2009) states, ‘corruption is the cancer of economics’ and although we do not have 
nearly as much success of curing cancer as we have of curing syphilis, it does not 
mean that we should invest ten times more into syphilis research than in cancer 
research. In order to effectively tackle corruption, the international community, in 
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particular the World Bank and IMF, must alter the way they view corruption and 
adopt a broader framework that better reflects the realities of corruption.  
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APPENDIX A 
SOURCES OF TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL’S CORRUPTION 
PERCEPTION INDEX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources Abbreviations Data 
Provider 
Subject Asked 
ADB Country 
Performance 
Assessment 
Ratings 
ADB Asian 
Development 
Bank 
Transparency, accountability, 
and corruption in the public 
sector 
AFDB Country 
Policy and 
Institutional 
Assessments 
AFDB 
 
African 
Development 
Bank 
Transparency, accountability, 
and corruption in the public 
sector 
 
Bertelsmann 
Transformation 
Index 
BTI 
 
Bertelsmann 
Foundation 
The government's capacity to 
punish and contain corruption 
Country Policy 
and Institutional 
Assessment 
CPIA 
 
World Bank  
 
Transparency, accountability 
and corruption in the public 
sector 
Country Risk 
Service and 
Country Forecast 
 
EIU 
 
Economic 
Intelligence 
Unit 
 
The misuse of public office for 
private (or political party) 
gain: including corruption in 
public procurement, misuse of 
public funds, corruption in 
public service, and 
prosecution of public office 
Nations in Transit 
 
FH 
 
Freedom 
House 
 
Extent of corruption as 
practiced in governments, as 
perceived by public and as 
reported in the implementation 
of anti-corruption initiatives 
Global Insight 
Country Risk Data 
 
GI 
 
Global Insight 
 
The likelihood of encountering 
corrupt officials, ranging from 
petty bureaucratic corruption 
to grand political corruption 
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Source: Transparency International (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMD World 
Competitiveness 
Yearbook 
IMD IMD 
International, 
Switzerland, 
World 
Competitive 
Center 
Category Institutional 
Framework - State Efficiency: 
'Bribing and Corruption 
exist/do not exist' 
Asian Intelligence 
Newsletter 
PERC 
 
Political & 
Economic Risk 
Consultancy 
How serious do you consider 
the problem of corruption to 
be in the public sector? 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Report 
 
WEF 
 
World Economic 
Forum 
 
Undocumented extra payment 
or bribes 1) exports and 
imports 2) public utilities 3) 
tax collection 4) public 
contracts and 5) judicial 
decisions are common/never 
occur 
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APPENDIX B 
SOURCES OF WBCC 
 
Sources Abbreviation Data Provider Subject Asked 
African 
Development 
Bank Country 
Policy and 
Institutional 
Assessments 
ADB 
 
African 
Development 
Bank 
 
Transparency/Corruption 
 
Asian 
Development 
Bank Country 
Policy and 
Institutional 
Assessments 
ASD 
 
Asian 
Development 
Bank 
 
Anti-Corruption 
 
Business 
Environment and 
Enterprise 
Performance 
Surveys 
BPS 
 
World Bank and 
European Bank 
for 
Reconstruction 
and 
Development 
 
How common is it for firms 
to have to pay irregular 
additional payments to get 
things done 
 
Business 
Environment 
Risk Intelligence 
 
BRI 
 
BERI S.A. 
 
Internal causes of Political 
Risk: Mentality, including 
xenophobia, nationalism, 
corruption, nepotism, 
willingness to compromise, 
etc 
Bertelsmann 
Transformation 
Index 
BTI 
 
Bertelsmann 
Foundation 
Corruption 
 
Countries at the 
Crossroads 
CCR Freedom House Transparency/Corruption 
Country Policy 
and Institutional 
Assessments 
CPIA 
 
The World Bank 
 
Transparency/Corruption 
 
Global Insight 
Global Risk 
Service 
DRI 
 
Global Insight 
 
Risk Event Outcome non-
price: Losses and Costs of 
Corruption  
Country Risk 
Service and 
Country Forecast 
EIU Economist 
Intelligence Unit 
Corruption 
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World Economic 
Forum Global 
Competitiveness 
Survey  
GCS 
 
World Economic 
Forum 
 
Public trust in financial honesty 
of politicians 
 
Global Integrity 
Index 
 
GII 
 
Global Integrity 
 
Anti-Corruption Law 
 
Gallup World Poll GWP The Gallup 
Organisation 
 
Is corruption in government 
widespread? 
IFAD Rural Sector 
Performance 
Assessments 
IFD 
 
International Fund 
for Agricultural 
Development 
Accountability, transparency and 
corruption in rural areas 
 
 
Institutional 
Profiles Database 
 
IPD 
 
French Ministry of 
the Economy, 
Finance and 
Industry, Agence 
Francais de 
Development 
 
Corruption 
 
Latinobarometro 
 
LBO Latinobarometro Have you heard of acts of 
corruption? 
Merchant 
International 
Group Gray Area 
Dynamics 
MIG 
 
Merchant 
International Group 
 
Corruption. There is an immense 
variety of activities that may be 
construed as corrupt. Bribery is 
the most obvious. However, what 
is and is not a bribe is a matter of 
presentation and perception in 
much the same way as 
"corruption" itself. Some of the 
issues that executives should 
consider include: accounting 
standards; anti-corruption policy 
credibility and enforceability, 
cronyism, nepotism and vested 
interests; cultural differences; 
judicial independence; 
transparency of decision-making 
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Source: Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Risk 
Services 
International 
Country Risk Guide 
 
PRS 
 
Political Risk 
Services 
 
Corruption. Measures corruption 
within the political system, which 
distorts the economic and financial 
environment; reduces the efficiency 
of government and business by 
enabling people to assume positions 
of power through patronage rather 
than ability, and introduces an 
inherently instability in the political 
system 
Political and 
Economic Risk 
Consultancy 
Corruption in Asia 
Survey 
PRC 
 
Political and 
Economic Risk 
Consultancy 
 
 
Corruption  
 
Quantitative Risk 
Measure in Foreign 
Lending 
QLM 
 
BERI S.A.  
 
Indirect Diversion of Funds 
 
Vanderbilt 
University 
Americas 
Barometer 
VAB 
 
Vanderbilt 
University 
 
Frequency of corruption among 
government officials 
 
World 
Competitiveness 
Yearbook 
WCY 
 
Institute for 
Management 
Development  
Bribing and corruption exist in the 
economy 
 
Global Insight 
Business and 
Conditions  
 
WMO 
 
Global Insight 
 
Corruption: This index assesses the 
intrusiveness of the country's 
bureaucracy. The amount of red tape 
likely to be countered is assessed, as 
is the likelihood of encouraging 
corrupt officials and other groups 
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APPENDIX C 
CRITICISMS OF THE CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 
  Since the creation of the CPI and WBCC, major improvements have been 
made to these indexes in order to overcome its limitations. However, certain 
challenges have not yet been adequately tackled. This has led many to question the 
credibility, validity and usefulness of these indexes as measures of corruption. The 
improvements on the corruption indicators have also made them increasing complex. 
These complexities have only generated its own set of problems. This appendix 
examines the failings of the CPI and WBCC. These problems can be categorised 
under three broad headings: (1) the corruption perception problem; (2) the 
measurement error problem; (3) the usability in policy formulation problem.  
The Corruption Perception Problem 
Both the CPI and the WBCC measure the perceived degree of corruption 
within a country. However, exactly whose perceptions are measured? 
 The common misconception is that these corruption indexes measure the 
perception of the general public. However, most of the sources that the CPI and the 
WBCC rely upon are expert assessments. Among the CPI’s 10 sources, only 3 sources 
surveys the public at large, while the rest are polls of country-analysts (See Appendix 
A). Similarly, only 8 out of the 24 sources utilised by the World Bank surveys the 
general public (See Appendix B). Therefore, it would be incorrect to assume that the 
CPI and WBCC represent the perceptions of the general public.  
 Relying mainly on these expert assessments can be problematic as they can be 
prone to bias. In most cases, the experts who dominate these assessments are staff of 
the organisations that are sources of the CPI and WBCC. Thus, there exist the 
possibility that the perceived degree of corruption is already skewed in a pre-
determined direction. Experts may answer the assessments with results that they 
expect to see. Moreover, these experts are usually non-residents of the countries they 
are assessing. This means that the results produced by the corruption indexes are the 
perceptions of a small pool of outsiders. This has led many critics to dismiss the CPI 
and WBCC as valid measures of corruption. John Lambsdorff (2007), the architect of 
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the CPI, has disputed these criticisms stating that non-resident experts usually have a 
good grasp of the culture and traditions of the countries concerned while at the same 
time are not influenced by certain parochial biases that residents may hold. He also 
argues that the judgements of these experts are more impartial as they are made 
according to universal ethical standards (Lambsdorff 2007, p. 6). A recent finding by 
Ko and Samajdar (2010) supports Lambsdorff’s argument. The authors found that the 
perception of the degree of corruption by international experts is a close reflection of 
the domestic perception of corruption.  
 However, even if we were to set aside the above-mentioned problems, a much 
greater problem exists. Many people have consistently misinterpreted the results of 
the CPI and WBCC as actual levels of corruption. Although these corruption indexes 
have gone through many changes, their sophisticated statistical construction does not 
equip them with the ability to measure actual levels of corruption within countries. 
Empirical studies have proven that perceptions of corruption have a weak association 
with actual levels of corruption (Donchev & Ujhelyi 2007; Olken 2009). This may be 
because an individual’s perception of corruption is often heavily dependant on social 
culture, prejudice gossip, media sensationalism and whether or not the individual 
themselves has been involved in corrupt activities (Williams 2006). The empirical 
findings suggest that there are certain types of corrupt practices that surveyors and 
experts are unaware of and thus go unreported. Therefore, ‘using corruption 
perception indices as a measure of corruption experience may be more problematic 
than suggested by the existing literature’ (Donchev & Ujhelyi 2007, p. 17). This is 
especially so given that the international community relies heavily on these corruption 
perceptions when designing anti-corruption strategies and also in guiding their aid 
allocation decisions. Although relying on subjective perceptions to construct the 
corruption indexes may currently be the best option1, it is imperative to remember that 
                                                
1 There has been an increased effort towards obtaining objective data (See Duncan 
2006; Golden and Picci 2005; Olken 2006). These objective data are still perception-
based but instead of asking for the surveyor’s opinions of corruption, these objective 
perception-based indicators are based on questions about real experiences. Utilising 
objective measurements in corruption assessments will get rid of the attitudinal bias 
that may be present in subjective data (Bradburn 1983). However, Kraay (2006) has 
pointed out that objective measurements ‘provide only imperfect proxies for real 
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these indicators are not flawless, and that the results produced may often be very 
different from actual levels of corruption.  
The Measurement Error Problem 
 The second category relates to the measurement errors present in the CPI and 
WBCC. Reliability is inversely related to random error of measurement (Carmines & 
Zeller 1979, p. 15). Therefore, in order for the CPI and WBCC to be reliable 
measures, they can only contain a small measurement error. Despite the major 
improvements made on the corruption indexes to reduce measurement errors, the 
magnitude of measurement errors in the indexes remains quite high. There are three 
reasons for this. First, given that the CPI and WBCC are constructed based on a 
number of primary sources, the variation among sources becomes a major source of 
random error. Second, the weighting schemes devised by the TI and Bank are 
defective and thus produces measurement errors. Lastly, measurement errors can also 
arise from yearly variations of the corruption indexes. 
 The high level of variance between sources produces measurement errors. 
Referring to the CPI in particular, The Economist stated that ‘a combination of few 
sources and high variance between them makes it hard to read much into simple 
averages, and hence into the rankings’ (The Economist, 30th October 1999). 
Researchers at the TI and World Bank have attempted to reduce the measurement 
errors by increasing the number of sources used in the CPI and WBCC (Ko & 
Samajdar 2010). These efforts have shown some results as the standard error of 
estimated corruption indexes published together with the CPI and the WBCC have 
reported significant reductions since 2000. However, Ko and Samajdar (2010) find 
evidence showing that the standard error present in the corruption indexes are still 
relatively high. Therefore, doubts remain as to whether the results produced by the 
two indexes are credible.  
 The defective weighting schemes of both indexes are also a source of 
measurement errors. Researchers at the TI and World Bank use specific weighting 
                                                
conditions on the ground’ and therefore may not necessarily provide us with an 
accurate image of reality. 
 63 
schemes in order to try and standardise the variety of sources utilised. The CPI 
standardisation procedure is based on the ‘matching percentiles technique’. This 
technique determines the ranks of countries from the common sub-samples of a new 
source and the previous year’s CPI.  The largest value in the CPI is then taken as the 
standardised value for the country ranked best by the new source. The second largest 
value would then be given to the country ranked second-best, and so on. For instance, 
imagine that the new sources ranked only four countries: United States, Singapore, 
Chile and Zimbabwe from best to worst. The previous year’s CPI values were 8.1, 
9.5, 2.2, 2.3 respectively. The ‘matching percentiles technique’ would give the United 
States the best score of 9.3, Singapore 8.1, Chile 2.3 and Zimbabwe 2.2. Even though 
certain information from the sources may be lost in this technique, the main benefit of 
it is that it keeps the standardised values between 0 (very corrupt) and 10 (highly 
clean) (Lambsdorff 2003, p. 7). However, this technique is not without its flaws. 
Although it may be necessary to have a baseline of comparison in order to rank 
countries according to their corruption levels, the ‘matching percentiles technique’ 
does not produce ranks that take into account the positive changes that might have 
been reported by some of the CPI’s sources (Gatlung 2006). Therefore, the rankings 
produced by the CPI may not be as credible as they are thought to be.  
 In terms of the WBCC, World Bank researchers use a weighting scheme that 
is based on the assumption that the errors of the sources used are uncorrelated across 
sources and countries (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2007). This means that the 
sources which are highly correlated are assumed to be more informative and are given 
higher weights than the other sources which are less correlated with the majority. 
Sources with the higher weights will have a larger influence on the result. Therefore, 
if four sources are chosen and three of them are similar, the weights attributed to the 
majority will be overbalanced whereas the source that has a lower correlation will 
have nearly no weight in the constructed index (Arndt and Oman 2006 p. 59). 
However, such a scheme is deficient. The fact that different sources are uncorrelated 
with one another does not mean that the information they provide is any less accurate 
than the others. Instead, it only reflects their greater accuracy of the underlying reality 
of corruption they are designed to reflect (Arndt and Oman 2006). Sources used in the 
construction of the WBCC may be much more interdependent than expected and 
weights attributed to certain sources can sometimes be overestimated. Given the 
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defective nature of the weighting scheme, the rankings and scores produced by the 
WBCC are highly suspicious.  
Lastly, measurement errors can also be due to variation between years. The 
standardisation procedure that is to place different sources on a common scale does 
not have the ability to detect and track changes and trends over time (Rohwer 2009, p. 
50). As the estimates for corruption are based on different sources, it is hard, if not 
impossible, to measure yearly trends. Changes in a country’s ranking could be 
attributed to the addition or reduction of sources (Galtung 2006). The availability (or 
otherwise) of sources for a given country can explain why countries drop in and out of 
the indexes. For example, an addition and removal of data sources for certain 
countries in a particular year can result in six countries being dropped out of the 
index, and two countries being added into it. This has the effect of changing the rank 
order of certain countries on the index. Therefore, countries may move up or down 
the CPI and WBCC but this may not necessarily mean that corruption levels have 
increased or dropped. Instead, these changes may be a result of the measurement 
errors produced by the yearly variations. Although many donor countries continue to 
allocate aid based on yearly trends, it is quite apparent that these indexes are 
unsuitable for any time-based analysis.   
The Usability in Policy Formulation Problem 
 Since coming into existence, the CPI and the WBCC have not been able to 
generate policy-focused data that can guide policymakers to develop anti-corruption 
strategies. However, now that global attention is focused on corruption, what is the 
use of the corruption indexes if they are unable to produce information that would 
help in the development of strategies to combat corruption.  
 In order for corruption measures to contribute to useful policy making, 
measures need to provide some clear and concise picture of what corruption is, in 
what context it is taking place and solutions that can combat this phenomena. The 
current corruption indexes have been criticised for not being able to achieve any of 
these. So far, assessments generated by these indexes are too broad to be converted 
into effective anti-corruption strategies (Urray 2007, p. 8).  
 65 
 The need for more ‘actionable’ indicators that can contribute to policy-
oriented solutions has led to the creation of a new category of corruption indexes. 
These indexes focus on non-perception measures and measures specific aspects of 
corruption that are connected to policy outcomes (See Duncan 2006). Examples of 
these indicators include the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
–Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Procurement Indicators or the Public 
Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) indicators. Although doubts have 
been raised about these non-perception indicators (Duncan 2006), the construction of 
new indicators to replace the current ones only questions the validity, reliability and 
usefulness of the CPI and WBCC.  
 The limitations of the CPI and WBCC prove how difficult it is to measure and 
assess corruption. Therefore, the efforts of the researchers at the World Bank and TI 
must be commended. However, these failings also call for the reassessment of the CPI 
and WBCC. Perhaps, after fifteen years, it is now time to find new measurements of 
corruption.   
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